



Socially Desirable Response Tendencies in Survey Research

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Abstract

Socially desirable responding (SDR) has been of long-standing interest to the field of marketing. Unfortunately, the construct has not always been well-understood by marketing researchers. The authors provide a review of the SDR literature organized around three key issues – the conceptualization and measurement of SDR, the nomological constellation of personality traits, values, sociodemographics, and cultural factors associated with SDR, and the vexing issue of substance versus style in SDR measures. The authors review the current “state of the literature”, identify unresolved issues, and provide new empirical evidence to assess the generalizability of existing knowledge, which is disproportionately based on U.S. student samples, to a global context. Their new evidence is derived from a large international data set involving 12,424 respondents in 26 countries on four continents.

Key words: socially desirable responding, egoistic response tendencies, moralistic response tendencies, international marketing, self-deceptive enhancement, impression management, survey research.

Surveys play a crucial role in marketing research. For example, of the 636 empirical articles that appeared in the *Journal of Marketing* and *Journal of Marketing Research* during 1996-2005, nearly 30 percent employed surveys (Rindfleisch et al. 2008). One frequently noted concern with self-reports collected through surveys is that respondents may not respond truthfully but simply provide answers that make them look good (Paulhus 2002, Tourangeau and Yan 2007). This phenomenon is called socially desirable responding (SDR). SDR introduces extraneous variation in scale scores, which compromises the validity of marketing survey data. Consequently, SDR has been called “one of the most pervasive response biases” in survey data (Mick 1996, p. 106).

Despite the generally recognized importance of SDR in survey research, it has attracted relatively little attention in marketing. Only two articles which are explicitly concerned with SDR (Fisher 1993; Mick 1996) have appeared in the major marketing journals in the recent past. Response biases including SDR are sometimes mentioned in scale development studies, but usually researchers simply report a correlation between the substantive construct of interest and an SDR scale and either conclude that SDR is not a problem (if the correlation is nonsignificant) or claim that SDR is not a serious issue (if the correlation is relatively small).

SDR has been an area of active research in recent years, especially in psychology, and this work has led to important new insights, which call into doubt theories and practices that are still considered standard in marketing. Our reading of the marketing literature has led us to identify at least four common misconceptions: (a) SDR can be validly conceptualized as a unidimensional construct; (b) any of the SDR scales available in the literature can be used to assess SDR because they all measure the same construct; (c) the goal is to avoid a significant correlation between substantive constructs and SDR scales because such an association always

implies contamination; and (d) the biasing influence of SDR can be removed simply by including a measure of SDR as a control variable.

Consequently, the aim of this paper is twofold – first, to update marketing researchers on the latest thinking in SDR research and second, to reinforce and extend what is known based on an unusually large international data set involving 12,424 nationally representative respondents in 26 countries on four continents. The paper is organized around three key issues that are important for an improved understanding and treatment of SDR in marketing survey research. First, we consider the SDR construct and its measurement. Next, we examine the nomological constellation of personality traits, values, sociodemographics and cultural factors associated with SDR. Like any other behavioral construct, SDR does not exist in isolation but rather derives much of its meaning from the theoretical constellation of related constructs. Finally, we discuss the vexing issue of whether respondents' ratings on SDR scales represent substance or style, and how researchers should interpret an association of SDR with a substantive marketing construct. Each issue is discussed in a separate section, in which we first provide a review of the literature and identify unresolved issues and then report new empirical evidence based on our global study. The paper concludes with guidelines for the field and suggestions for future research.

THE CONSTRUCT OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING

An in-depth discussion of SDR should start with the construct per se, which has been the target of considerable debate over the years. In this section, we discuss different conceptualizations and self-report measures proposed in the literature, and review prior use of SDR scales in the marketing literature. Finally, we present new empirical evidence and address several unresolved issues using our global study.

Varieties of Social Desirability

Socially desirable responses are answers that make the respondent look good, based on cultural norms about the desirability of certain values, traits, attitudes, interests, opinions, and behaviors. In the past, social desirability has been studied either as a characteristic of items or as an aspect of personality. Our focus here is on the latter, that is, respondents' enduring tendencies to provide overly positive self-descriptions (Paulhus 2002).

Initially, SDR was conceptualized as a unidimensional construct and several instruments were developed to measure individual differences in SDR. However, low correlations between these scales soon led to the formulation of various two-factor models. One proposal was that SDR could be either a reflection of an exaggerated but honestly held self-view – an unconscious tendency to claim positive attributes and deny negative ones – or a deliberate attempt to project a favorable self-image. Terms such as alpha or gamma bias, self- versus other-deception, and self-deceptive enhancement as opposed to impression management were used to refer to these different expressions of SDR (Paulhus 1991).

More recently, instead of emphasizing the distinction between two forms of SDR based on level of awareness (nonconscious vs. conscious), researchers have focused on the difference between two content domains in which SDR may be displayed. According to this view, self-favoring response tendencies are best understood in the context of two “fundamental modalities of human experience” – agency and communion (Paulhus and John 1998). Some people are more likely to engage in SDR in agency-related contexts, involving dominance, assertiveness, autonomy, influence, control, mastery, uniqueness, power, status, and independence. Paulhus and John (1998) called this form of SDR *egoistic response tendencies* (ERT). Other people are more likely to engage in SDR in communion-related contexts, associated with affiliation,

belonging, intimacy, love, connectedness, approval, and nurturance. Paulhus and John (1998) referred to this type of SDR as *moralistic response tendencies* (MRT).

The most elaborate conceptualization of SDR to date has been proposed by Paulhus (2002), who cross-classifies SDR by degree of awareness and domain of content. Thus, positively biased (superhero-like) self-perceptions on intellectual, social, and emotional qualities (ERT) can be unconscious and honestly held, or deliberately and strategically projected. Similarly, positively biased (saint-like) self-perceptions on attributes related to responsibility and interpersonal relations (MRT) can be sincere and genuinely believed, or purposefully and instrumentally distorted. Paulhus (2002) argued that conscious impression management was more susceptible to situational demands and therefore less consistent across contexts and time, whereas unconscious self-deception was more dispositional and trait-like.

Self-Report Measures of Socially Desirable Responding

Many scales have been proposed over the years to measure individual differences in SDR (see Paulhus 1991 for a review and references to the original literature). Among these are the Edwards SD scale, the Wiggins Sd scale, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale, various lie scales such as the EPI Lie Scale, and Paulhus' own Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). The BIDR is the only multidimensional instrument and differentiates between self-deceptive enhancement (SDE), which was assumed to measure unconscious positivity bias, and impression management (IM), which was thought to assess deliberate inflation of self-descriptions. A third subscale, called self-deceptive denial, was also hypothesized to measure unconscious bias, but it usually correlates strongly with IM and is not used frequently. The Edwards SD scale is closely related to SDE, whereas the Wiggins Sd scale and the EPI Lie scale are strongly associated with IM. Paulhus (1991) argued that, although the

Marlowe-Crowne scale was significantly correlated with both SDE and IM, it was primarily a measure of conscious distortion. However, a number of studies show that the correlations with SDE and IM are quite similar (e.g., Helmes and Holden 2003).

Recent studies have demonstrated that it is important to distinguish between the agentic and communal forms of SDR (i.e., ERT and MRT), and that the SDE and IM subscales of the BIDR can be used to measure ERT and MRT, respectively (Konstabel, Aavik, and Allik 2006; Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson 2006; Paulhus 2002; Paulhus and John 1998; Pauls and Crost 2004; Pauls and Stemmler 2003). Paulhus (1991) reported reliabilities from .68 to .80 for SDE and from .75 to .86 for IM, but a number of more recent studies showed lower scale reliabilities – in the mid .60s for SDE and in the low .70s for IM (Pauls and Stemmler 2003; Meston et al. 1996; Reid-Seiser and Fritzsche 2001; Roth and Herzberg 2007). SDE and IM exhibit discriminant validity, their intercorrelation being in the .05-.40 range (Paulhus 1991; Pauls and Stemmler 2003).

Paulhus (2002) further suggested that the SDE scale assessed unconscious ERT, that the self-deceptive denial scale measured unconscious MRT, and that the IM scale (which should be renamed communion management to more clearly express the fact that it measures only one form of impression management, namely, moralistic impression management) captured deliberate MRT. According to Paulhus, no scale exists to measure agency management (deliberate ERT).

However, the notion that the SDE scale assesses unconscious bias and the IM scale assesses conscious bias has been largely discredited (Pauls and Crost 2004; Roth and Herzberg 2007). Initial support for this idea was based on findings that IM was quite sensitive to explicit “fake good” manipulations, whereas SDE was not. Subsequent research showed that this was primarily due to the fact that the “fake good” manipulations had a connotation of “fake

communion” and that if “fake agency” instructions were used, both scales were equally sensitive to faking manipulations. It appears that while the SDE and IM scales can be used effectively to differentiate ERT from MRT, the two scales do not tap unconscious and conscious bias, respectively. In situations where demands for favorable self-presentation are minimal (e.g., when the topic is not sensitive and the data are collected anonymously), the SDE and IM scales are likely to capture unconscious biases. In contrast, when situational pressures to project a favorable image are strong (e.g., with explicit faking instructions, when the topic is sensitive and public disclosure of responses is possible, when something is at stake as in personnel selection contexts), the two scales probably capture both unconscious biases (which emerge even in the absence of situational demands) and conscious biases (which are encouraged by the situation).

Table 1 summarizes our review of the literature on the conceptualization and measurement of SDR and identifies several important unresolved issues.

--- Table 1 about here ---

Prior Use of SDR Scales in Marketing Research

We conducted a search of the marketing literature in order to determine how often SDR scales were used in empirical research. Specifically, we analyzed how often the two most well-known scales (Marlowe-Crowne, BIDR) were used in articles in the *Journal of Marketing Research*, *Journal of Marketing*, and *Journal of Consumer Research*. This analysis showed that the Marlowe-Crowne scale was by far the most frequently employed SDR instrument. It appeared in 26 articles between 1968 and 2008. In 23 cases, the Marlowe-Crowne scale was used to check for response bias in a construct of interest or to control for response bias when investigating the relationship between substantive constructs. In three instances, the Marlowe-Crowne scale served as a measure of a substantive construct (e.g., social approval). The BIDR

was used in only 7 articles between 1996 and 2008. In 4 applications only the IM scale was employed, once the overall BIDR scale was used, and in 2 instances both the SDE and IM scales were applied. With one exception, the BIDR was used to control for response bias.

These results show three things. First, it appears that SDR scales are used infrequently in the major marketing journals. Second, if an SDR scale is employed, it is usually the Marlowe-Crowne scale, which does not distinguish between different forms of SDR and which actually confounds egoistic and moralistic responding. Third, almost without exception, an association with SDR is treated as evidence of response bias. As shown in more detail below, this practice is not, in general, warranted.

Empirical Evidence from the Global Study

In our empirical study, ERT and MRT were measured with the SDE and IM subscales of Paulhus' (1991) BIDR. The BIDR consists of 20 SDE and 20 IM items, but the market research agencies that administered the surveys considered the full 40-item scale too long to administer and were concerned about respondent drop-out (see also De Jong, Steenkamp, and Veldkamp 2009). We therefore selected a subset of 10 SDE and 10 IM items by omitting potentially offensive and/or inappropriate items while retaining the balanced structure of the scale (five positively and five negatively worded items per SDR dimension). Five-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) were used to collect the ratings. Table 2 presents the items.

Our extensive data set – collected among more than 12,000 respondents in 26 countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas – allows us to examine basic characteristics of these measures of choice for ERT and MRT on a global scale. Details of our entire data collection effort are provided in the Web Appendix. Respondents' latent ERT and MRT scores were estimated using

a recently developed hierarchical IRT modeling technique which relaxes the condition of cross-national measurement invariance. Reliability of the construct is calculated as

$(\sigma_{\theta}^2 - 1 / I(\theta)) / \sigma_{\theta}^2$, where θ indicates a latent trait and $I(\theta)$ is the scale information function (see De Jong, Steenkamp, and Veldkamp 2009 for details).

The average reliabilities for ERT and MRT were .67 and .73, with a range from .49-.76 and .67-.77, respectively. In 25 out of 26 countries, MRT is measured more reliably than ERT. Thus, although the BIDR was developed and refined in North America, both components of SDR can typically be measured with a reasonable degree of reliability around the world (the only exception was ERT in Thailand, where the reliability was only .49). These results are especially encouraging given that negatively keyed items often work less well in non-Western countries. ERT and MRT also exhibit discriminant validity in all countries. The average correlation between ERT and MRT was .31, with a range of .19-.43. Figure 1 gives the country means on ERT and MRT (relative to the USA, which is indexed at 100). The figure shows that ERT and MRT are not equally prevalent around the world. In the next section, we will examine possible cultural causes.

--- Table 2 and Figure 1 about here ---

THE CONSTELLATION OF EGOISTIC AND MORALISTIC RESPONDING

Like other behavioral constructs, ERT and MRT do not exist in isolation but rather derive much of their meaning from the nomological constellation of related constructs. Understanding this constellation provides additional insights into the two dimensions of SDR. In this section, we first discuss previous work on the relations of ERT and MRT with personality traits, personal values, sociodemographics, and national culture. Next, we present new evidence to reinforce what is known and to investigate unresolved issues based on our global study.

Personality Traits

Personality traits represent basic human ways of experiencing and reacting to the world. The dominant conceptualization of personality is the Big Five factor model, which distinguishes between five fundamental personality traits: extraversion, emotional stability (or its opposite, neuroticism), agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience (Digman 1990). At an even more abstract level the Big Five factors tend to load on two higher-order constructs consisting of openness to experience and extraversion on the one hand and agreeableness and conscientiousness on the other hand (the position of emotional stability is less clear). Digman (1997) related the two factors to the theoretical distinction between agency (openness to experience and extraversion) and communion (agreeableness and conscientiousness).

The motives underlying ERT and MRT are congruent with the consistencies in behavior captured by the two sets of traits. People engage in egoistic responding to satisfy their power and achievement strivings and their needs for mastery and control, and behavioral regularities such as being outgoing, generating enthusiasm, or radiating energy (extraversion) and having an imaginative mind, being open to new ideas, or valuing change (openness to experience) support these motives. In contrast, MRT entails an avoidance of disapproval by conforming to social norms and a positive valuation of relationships and intimacy. Being considerate, cooperating with others, or showing affection (agreeableness) and doing things thoroughly, controlling one's impulses, or showing perseverance (conscientiousness) are in accord with these motives (Paulhus 2002; Pauls and Stemmler 2003).

Two additional issues have to be mentioned briefly. First, in Paulhus and John's (1998) theoretical work, emotional stability is not directly involved in either ERT or MRT. However, key characteristics of emotional stability such as high self-esteem and dominant-assured

personality have clear agency qualities. In support of this notion, Mick (1996) reported that self-esteem, conceptualized as a psychological adjustment construct, exhibited a correlation of .53 ($p < .001$) with ERT and a correlation of .21 ($p < .01$) with MRT. Hence, we may expect a primary association of emotional stability with ERT and a secondary association with MRT. Second, Digman (1997, p. 1251) noted a small but consistent relation between conscientiousness and the agency meta-factor, which may be explained by the fact that conscientiousness includes the subfactors of achievement and competence (see also Paulhus and John 1998). These considerations suggest that conscientiousness may exhibit a secondary effect on ERT.

The relationship between the Big Five factors and ERT/MRT has attracted considerable empirical research, which is summarized in Table 3 (including sample-size weighted average correlations and 95% confidence intervals). Across all studies, emotional stability is strongly related to ERT ($\bar{r} = .46$), and exhibits a secondary relation with MRT ($\bar{r} = .23$).

Conscientiousness and agreeableness are consistently related to MRT (\bar{r} 's of .28 and .32, respectively), although conscientiousness has an equally strong association with ERT ($\bar{r} = .32$). Openness to experience and extraversion are primarily related to ERT (\bar{r} 's of .13 and .26, respectively), although the magnitude of the correlations for openness is quite weak.

--- Table 3 about here ---

While many of these results are consistent with theoretical expectations, several issues remain. First and foremost, there are questions about the generalizability of the findings because all studies were conducted in North America and Europe and the participants were mostly students. Second, prior studies relied on bivariate correlations between SDR and the Big Five, which ignore the shared variance among the latter. As indicated earlier, at a higher level the Big

Five load on two factors, so it is of interest to investigate whether previous findings change when ERT and MRT are regressed on all five trait factors simultaneously. Third, contrary to expectations, conscientiousness does not have a stronger relation with MRT than with ERT.

Values

Values are concepts or beliefs pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct which transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior, and are ordered by relative importance (Schwartz 1992, p. 4). It is currently widely accepted that the most comprehensive and rigorously validated representation of human values is the Schwartz value typology (Schwartz 1992). Schwartz derived a typology of ten distinct types of values that reflect a continuum of related motivations. The value types are organized into four higher-order value domains – self-enhancement, openness to change, self-transcendence, and conservation.

Self-enhancement values express the extent to which people are motivated to enhance their personal interests – even at the expense of others. Underlying the self-enhancement domain are the value types of power and achievement. People placing priority on self-enhancement values should be more prone to exhibit ERT. *Openness to change* values derive from people's needs for control, autonomy, independence, and stimulation. These values have in common that they motivate people to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and uncertain directions, which is congruent with the agency motive underlying ERT.

Self-transcendence arrays values in terms of the extent to which they motivate people to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and society at large. Self-transcendence encompasses the value types of benevolence and universalism. Benevolence focuses on concern for the welfare of close others, and universalism on understanding, appreciation and protection of the welfare of all people. According to Paulhus

and John (1998, p. 1039), the communion orientation underlying MRT extends beyond relationships to the positive value placed on “benefiting others, even the society as a whole,” which mirrors benevolence and universalism, respectively. Therefore, self-transcendence should be positively related to MRT. Finally, *conservation* values have in common that they motivate people to “preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions, and traditions” (Schwartz 1992, p. 43). This is expressed in people’s need for security, harmony, and conformity. Conservation values are clearly congruent with the communion orientation of MRT.

The research of Shavitt and colleagues (Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson 2006; Shavitt et al. 2006) sheds some light on the relations between the Schwartz value typology and ERT and MRT. These authors focused on four cultural orientations at the individual level, namely, horizontal versus vertical individualism and collectivism. These cultural orientations broadly mirror the Schwartz value typology. Vertical individualists emphasize self-enhancement values, whereas horizontal individualists emphasize openness to change values. Vertical collectivists stress conservation values, while horizontal collectivists emphasize self-transcendence (Shavitt et al. 2006). Across nine studies among samples of U.S. respondents, Shavitt and colleagues found that horizontal individualism (horizontal collectivism) was consistently positively correlated with ERT (MRT). Thus, Shavitt and colleagues provide indirect empirical support for the notion that openness to change (self-transcendence) should be positively related to ERT (MRT). They neither predicted nor found evidence for the role of vertical individualism and vertical collectivism in shaping ERT and MRT, respectively. This might imply that there is no relation between self-enhancement (conservation) and ERT (MRT). Alternatively, it is possible that

vertical individualism (vertical collectivism) does not fully mirror self-enhancement (conservation).

Sociodemographics

Gender is the only sociodemographic variable that has been repeatedly examined in the context of ERT and MRT. Research has consistently found that men score higher than women on ERT, while women score higher than men on MRT (Heine and Lehman 1995; Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson 2006; Paulhus 1991). Gender differences on ERT and MRT may be explained by traditional, gender-based socialization roles.

National Culture

Crowne and Marlowe (1964) already suggested that people's tendency to engage in socially desirable responding might be systematically related to the culture in which they live. Agency and communion can be related to two of the dimensions of national culture distinguished by Hofstede (2001) – individualism/collectivism and masculinity/femininity.

Individualism/collectivism pertains to the degree to which people in a country prefer to act as individuals rather than as members of a group. Members of individualistic societies place their personal goals and desires ahead of those of the in-group. In contrast, in collectivistic countries there is a close-knit social structure, where people expect their group to care for them in exchange for unwavering loyalty. The desire for uniqueness and independence are core elements of individualism, while conformity and interdependence are central to collectivism (Hofstede 2001).

Since agency traits such as independence, self-reliance, and uniqueness are socially desirable in individualistic cultures, exaggerated self-perceptions on these qualities are likely to be beneficial. In contrast, collectivistic cultures are conformity-oriented, and loyalty to the group

and concern for promoting the group's continued existence are rewarded. Communal traits such as belongingness and maintenance of social relationships are socially desirable in collectivistic cultures, which should encourage people to present themselves in a favorable light on these traits in order to meet interpersonal goals (Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson 2006).

Several studies have contrasted mean differences on ERT or MRT between a collectivistic country and an individualistic country. Heine and Lehman (1995) found no differences between Canadian and Japanese students on either ERT or MRT. However, Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson (2006) reported that U.S. students were significantly higher than Singaporean students on ERT and significantly lower on MRT. Church (2000) reviewed research showing that North Americans score higher than Asians on self-esteem measures and list more positive self-statements. This may be taken as indirect evidence for the notion that ERT is higher in individualistic countries. Van Hemert et al. (2002) correlated the aggregate scores of 23 countries on Hofstede's (2001) Individualism/Collectivism dimension with country means on MRT (as measured by the Eysenck Lie scale). They reported a correlation of $-.68$ ($p < .01$). In sum, there is strong evidence that MRT is higher in collectivistic countries than in individualistic countries. The evidence concerning a positive relationship between individualism and ERT is more equivocal.

Masculinity/femininity refers to the dominance of ego-enhancing versus relationship-enhancing tendencies in a culture, which are often associated with male and female gender roles. In masculine cultures, the dominant values are assertiveness, achievement, and success, while the dominant values in feminine cultures are quality of life, warm interpersonal relationships, and caring for the weak. Since a focus on achievement, power, and dominance encourages self-favoring tendencies on these dimensions, masculine cultures should be more likely to exhibit

ERT. On the other hand, an emphasis on relationships, nurturance, and the welfare of people and nature is more in line with a self-favoring communion orientation, so that feminine cultures should be more likely to exhibit MRT. Van Hemert et al. (2002) reported a correlation of -.17 between masculinity/femininity and MRT. This correlation is consistent with theoretical expectations but did not reach statistical significance, due to the low power of the test.

Our review of the literature on the constellation of SDR is summarized in Table 1. The table also lists unresolved issues addressed in the global study, which is described next.

Empirical Evidence from the Global Study

Method. In our global survey, we included measures for the Big Five Inventory, the Schwartz Value Survey, as well as sociodemographics (see the Web Appendix). Hierarchical IRT modeling was used to compute the latent scores on the personality and value constructs. Table 4 provides information on their reliabilities and reports correlations between all individual difference variables, pooled across countries. The nomological constellation of ERT and MRT was investigated using the following multi-level specification:

Level-1:

$$(1) \quad SDR_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}O_{ij} + \beta_{2j}E_{ij} + \beta_{3j}ES_{ij} + \beta_{4j}C_{ij} + \beta_{5j}A_{ij} + \beta_{6j}SE_{ij} + \beta_{7j}OPEN_{ij} + \beta_{8j}ST_{ij} + \beta_{9j}CONS_{ij} + \beta_{10j}GENDER_{ij} + \beta_{11j}AGE_{ij} + \beta_{12j}EDUC_{ij} + \beta_{13j}SocClass_{ij} + r_{ij}$$

Level-2:

$$(2) \quad \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} IND/COL_j + \gamma_{02} MAS/FEM_j + u_{0j}$$

$$(3) \quad \beta_{qj} = \gamma_{q0} + u_{qj} \quad \text{for } q = 1, \dots, 13$$

where i denotes individuals ($i = 1, \dots, 12,424$) and j countries ($j = 1, \dots, 26$). SDR refers to either ERT or MRT; O, E, ES, C, A indicate openness to experience, extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness, respectively; $SE, OPEN, ST,$ and $CONS$ refer to self-enhancement, openness to change, self-transcendence, and conservation, respectively; $GENDER,$

AGE, EDUC, and SocClass represent the sociodemographic variables gender, age, level of education, and social class; and IND/COL and MAS/FEM are national-cultural individualism/collectivism, and masculinity/femininity. We used the latent IRT-based scores for ERT, MRT, the personality factors, and the value domains. Within-group centering was employed. The individual-level error term r_{ij} is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ^2 . The random effects u_{qj} are multivariate normally distributed over countries, each with an expected value of zero, $\text{var}(u_{qj}) = \tau_{qq}$, and $\text{cov}(u_{qj}, u_{q'j}) = \tau_{qq'}$. Random effects whose variance was not significantly different from zero were constrained to fixed effects (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

Estimation. As a baseline model, we estimated a model with a random intercept but no individual-level or country-level covariates. The level-1 variances for ERT and MRT were .034 and .173, and the level-2 variances were .016 and .025, respectively. Thus, about 32 (13) percent of the variation in ERT (MRT) was between countries. After adding the individual-level covariates, the level-1 variances decreased to .025 (ERT) and .133 (MRT), respectively. Thus, these constructs explained 27 percent of individual differences in ERT and 25 percent of individual differences in MRT. Finally, we included the cultural variables, which explained 29 (18) percent of the cross-national variation in ERT (MRT). Multicollinearity is no reason for concern as all VIF values are below 3.

The (unstandardized) parameter estimates are reported in Table 5. In multilevel analysis, standardized coefficients are not used as the variance is partitioned across different levels.

Personality. Our results confirm that conscientiousness ($\gamma_{40,\text{MRT}} = .1714, p < .01$) and agreeableness ($\gamma_{50,\text{MRT}} = .1226, p < .01$) are positively associated with MRT. Also as expected, conscientiousness has a positive secondary effect on ERT ($\gamma_{40,\text{ERT}} = .0694, p < .01$), and

agreeableness is unrelated to ERT. Further supporting previous research, openness to experience ($\gamma_{10,ERT} = .0258, p < .01$) and extraversion ($\gamma_{20,ERT} = .0181, p < .01$) are positively related to ERT, although the effect sizes are smaller than those for conscientiousness/agreeableness and MRT. Extraversion has a small negative effect on MRT ($\gamma_{20,MRT} = -.0202, p < .05$), but openness is unrelated to MRT. The effects of emotional stability on ERT and MRT are both significant ($\gamma_{30,ERT} = .0491, p < .01$; $\gamma_{30,MRT} = .0210, p < .01$), but the former is more than twice as large.

Overall, these results support prior research, and they address unresolved issues in three ways (Table 1). First, they indicate that the predicted relationships are generalizable across a diverse sample of respondents from many different cultures. Second, our multivariate procedure allows for the assessment of the unique effect of each trait, controlling for the effects of other traits, thus alleviating a methodological limitation of previous research. Third, consistent with theoretical arguments, conscientiousness is indeed more strongly related to MRT than to ERT.

Values. In general, the findings confirm the predicted relationships between the four value domains and ERT/MRT. Openness to change is positively related to ERT ($\gamma_{70,ERT} = .0060, p < .01$), while self-transcendence has a positive effect on MRT ($\gamma_{80,MRT} = .1010, p < .01$), which is conceptually consistent with previous research by Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson (2006). In addition, self-enhancement is positively associated with ERT ($\gamma_{60,ERT} = .0061, p < .01$), and conservation has a significant positive influence on MRT ($\gamma_{90,MRT} = .0519, p < .01$). Finally, self-enhancement and openness to change have significant negative relationships with MRT ($\gamma_{60,MRT} = -.0609, p < .01$, $\gamma_{70,MRT} = -.0557, p < .01$). Although not hypothesized, this finding makes sense because these values are in conflict with need for approval.

Sociodemographics. Confirming previous research, ERT is higher for males, whereas MRT is higher for females ($\gamma_{100,ERT} = -.0131, p < .01, \gamma_{100,MRT} = .0281, p < .01$). Further, older respondents are higher on both ERT and MRT ($\gamma_{110,ERT} = .0006, p < .01$, and $\gamma_{110,MRT} = .0038, p < .01$). Education has a negative effect on ERT and a positive effect on MRT ($\gamma_{120,ERT} = -.0044, p < .05, \gamma_{120,MRT} = .0095, p < .05$). Social class is unrelated to ERT and MRT.

Relative effect of the three types of individual-difference variables. We performed a series of sequential analyses to examine the relative contribution of the three blocks of individual-difference variables. We started by entering sociodemographics as this information is widely used by marketing practitioners. Next, we added personality and then values, and vice versa. We focus on the change in explained variance. The results (see Table 6) show several things. First, people's psychological makeup is much more important in explaining ERT and MRT than their sociodemographic characteristics. Second, for both types of SDR, personality traits have a greater impact than a person's values. Third, personality traits have a substantially greater impact on ERT than on MRT, while values had a much bigger effect on MRT than on ERT.

National culture. Our findings are consistent with earlier research in that individualistic countries are lower on MRT ($\gamma_{01,MRT} = -.0020, p < .01$). Our findings also address the unresolved issue of the effect of masculinity. In our data masculine countries are characterized by somewhat higher ERT scores ($\gamma_{02,ERT} = .0005, p < .10$) and lower MRT scores ($\gamma_{02,MRT} = -.0007, p < .10$). However, whereas previous research tends to suggest that individualistic countries are higher on ERT, we found the opposite ($\gamma_{01,ERT} = -.0016, p < .05$). Interestingly, Yik, Bond, and Paulhus (1998) reported a similar finding. They showed that, overall and relative to a comparable North American sample, Chinese respondents tended to self-efface. However, on agentic traits there

was actually a tendency toward self-enhancement. Sedikides, Gaertner, and Toguchi (2003) provided additional evidence, documenting that people in all cultures have a need to self-enhance. Thus, it appears that the relationship between individualism and collectivism on the one hand and ERT and MRT on the other hand is more complicated than initially assumed.

--- Tables 4 to 6 about here ---

*THE MEANING OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
SDR SCALES AND MEASURES OF MARKETING CONSTRUCTS*

So far, we have examined the two dimensions of the construct of SDR and embedded ERT and MRT in a constellation of associated personality traits, values, sociodemographics, and national culture. We have not addressed yet whether the systematic variance captured by SDR scales always signals stylistic contamination, as has typically been assumed in the marketing literature, or whether it could also indicate substance. In this section, we discuss this vexing issue and expand on previous work by proposing a procedure to assess whether or not an observed association of ERT or MRT with a substantive marketing scale constitutes non-negligible bias. Finally, we use our global data set to identify, for 9 substantive marketing scales, in which countries potential contamination with ERT and MRT is minimal. In these countries, marketing researchers can use the scale in question without having to worry about SDR contamination.

Do ERT and MRT Scales Capture Substance or Style?

Following Tourangeau and Yan (2007), a high score on an SDR scale may indicate one or more of the following: (a) although the self-descriptions given are seemingly overly positive, the respondent actually engages in the socially desirable behaviors, and refrains from engaging in the socially undesirable behaviors, reported; (b) the respondent provides exaggerated self-

descriptions, but the self-reports are sincere; and (c) the respondent deliberately presents an inflated self-view in order to manage a certain impression. In the first case the SDR scale clearly captures substance, and in the last case it clearly captures style. The second case is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the self-report is distorted, so if style is equated with bias (i.e., departure from reality), there is stylistic responding. On the other hand, the self-report is sincere and if “positive illusions” are seen as a component of the substantive construct of interest, there may be grounds for viewing unconscious bias as substantive (see Paulhus 1991).

To determine whether shared variance between an SDR scale and a measure of a construct of interest is due to substantive or stylistic overlap, several procedures have been proposed. Consider first correlational approaches to separate accurate responses from overly positive self-reports (regardless of whether they are made unconsciously or deliberately). One procedure is based on the idea that if an SDR scale assesses distortion, it should be positively correlated with the extent to which a self-report exceeds a hypothesized unbiased criterion for the self-report. Paulhus et al. (2003) call such indices criterion discrepancy measures and distinguish operational criteria (e.g., intelligence test scores) and social consensus criteria (e.g., ratings by knowledgeable observers). Let S and SDR refer to respondents' self-reports on a substantive marketing scale of interest and some SDR scale, respectively, O be an appropriate criterion measure for the self-report (e.g., peer rating), and regress S on both O and SDR :

$$(4) \quad S = a_0 + a_1 O + a_2 SDR$$

If $a_2 > 0$, this supports the validity of SDR as a measure of response distortion. Prior empirical research using this approach has demonstrated that SDR scales indeed assess overly positive responding (e.g., Paulhus 2002; Paulhus et al. 2003; Pauls and Stemmler 2003).

The criterion discrepancy approach has considerable intuitive appeal, but there are several problematic aspects. First, truly objective criterion measures are rare, and even if they exist, they are cumbersome to collect. Second, bias measures based on self- and observer-ratings may not be a valid indicator of overly positive self-presentation because (a) a self-rating that is higher than an observer rating does not necessarily indicate *self*-favoring because the respondent may provide overly positive ratings in general, to self as well as others (see Kwan et al. 2004) and (b) observer ratings may not be a valid (unbiased) criterion measure (e.g., Konstabel, Aavik, and Allik 2006).

Another procedure is based on a comparison of the criterion-related validity of S (i.e., the self-report measure for the marketing construct of interest) for predicting O (i.e., the rating of the respondent on the same construct by a knowledgeable observer, although in general any external criterion, such as a measure of objective job performance, could be used), with or without controlling for SDR. The two models that are compared are:

$$(5) \quad O = b'_0 + b'_1 S$$

and

$$(6) \quad O = b_0 + b_1 S + b_2 \text{SDR}.$$

Assuming that O is free of stylistic variance so that the overlap in variance between S and O is solely due to shared substantive variation (or at a minimum that the stylistic variance in O is uncorrelated with the stylistic variance in S and SDR), a significant relationship between S and SDR is attributed to style or substance by comparing b'_1 with b_1 : (a) if $b_1 > b'_1$, SDR measures primarily style (controlling for SDR purifies the relationship between O and S); and (b) if $b_1 < b'_1$, SDR measures primarily substance (controlling for SDR removes substantive variance and

thus weakens the original substantive relationship between O and S). The case of $b_1 \approx b'_1$ most likely indicates that SDR measures both style and substance, unless SDR was unrelated to S to begin with, in which case the issue of whether SDR captures substantive or stylistic variance in S does not arise.

Starting with the influential study by McCrae and Costa (1983), research based on the partialing approach has usually shown that the coefficient of S remains unchanged, or that its magnitude decreases in absolute value, when SDR is introduced as a control variable, which is inconsistent with the notion that SDR scales measure only style (see Kurtz, Tarquini, and Iobst 2007 and Pauls and Stemmler 2003 for recent evidence). Unfortunately, despite claims to the contrary, these studies are not as conclusive as they first appear because the assumption of unbiased criterion scores is probably not generally true. If the association between S and O in equation (5) is due to both substance and style, then b'_1 is not a useful standard of comparisons because b'_1 is inflated due to shared stylistic variance between S and O.

Partial correlation approaches have also been used to check whether relationships between different constructs are influenced by socially desirable responding. In this case, the problems associated with the partialing approach are exacerbated because O is no longer a (presumably unbiased) criterion but now refers to a measure of another construct collected from the same respondent. If one assumes that the association between O and S in equation (5) is due to substance and SDR measures substance, $b_1 < b'_1$ implies that SDR incorrectly removed substantive variance from S and O, whereas if one assumes that the initial association between O and S was inflated by style and SDR measures style, $b_1 < b'_1$ suggests that controlling for SDR

successfully removed the confounding effect of stylistic variance (see Mick 1996 for an example of this type of reasoning).

It is clear that all the correlational techniques reviewed so far have serious shortcomings. Consequently, researchers have proposed other procedures that are based on a different logic. These alternative techniques have also been used to differentiate between unconscious and deliberate distortion, which the correlational methods are ill-equipped to handle. The basic idea is to experimentally manipulate the degree of demand for self-presentation and to compare respondents' scores in "standard" (low demand) and "fake good" (high demand) conditions (see Paulhus 2002). Asking respondents to "fake good" should encourage deliberate misrepresentation, so if scores on socially desirable constructs increase relative to the "standard" (control) condition, this provides evidence that conscious SDR can contaminate scores. Of particular relevance, prior research has shown that SDR scales are sensitive to demand manipulations, which suggests that they can capture deliberate distortion (McFarland and Ryan 2006; Pauls and Crost 2004; Roth and Herzberg 2007). One important question raised by these findings is of course whether respondents will naturally distort their answers to questions when situational demands are high, even when they are not explicitly asked to do so.

Summarizing (see Table 1), there is broad consensus in the psychological literature that SDR scales contain both substantive and stylistic variance. A correlation between a marketing construct and an SDR scale may indicate confounding, but the evidence is not conclusive. Partialing SDR from measures of substantive marketing constructs is of limited usefulness, and more explicit experimental manipulations are needed to establish whether scores on constructs of interest are contaminated.

A Procedure to Check for SDR Bias in Marketing Constructs

Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose the following procedure to address the substance versus style issue (see Figure 2 for a flowchart). The first step is to investigate whether there is a potential problem with SDR bias. This involves establishing whether there is an association between the marketing construct of interest and SDR. If the associations with both ERT and MRT are negligible, there is no social desirability problem and the researcher can safely proceed. If either MRT or ERT has a non-negligible relationship with the marketing construct, additional analyses are necessary to shed further light on the issue.

What constitutes a negligible or non-negligible relationship probably depends on the magnitude of the associations typically encountered in the area of research under consideration, but based on our experience in scale construction and survey research we propose that a standardized regression coefficient exceeding .2 indicates a non-negligible relationship between SDR and the marketing scale of interest. Since ERT and MRT are positively correlated, a standardized coefficient of .2 roughly corresponds to a zero-order correlation greater than .2, which is halfway between a small and a medium effect size.

The next step is to investigate whether or not the association between the marketing construct and SDR is due to shared stylistic variance, and whether the bias (if there is bias) is unconscious or deliberate. Initially, a conceptual analysis of the situation at hand should be conducted. When demands for favorable self-presentation are minimal (e.g., when the items contained in the scale do not measure highly sensitive topics, the data collection occurs under conditions of guaranteed anonymity of responses, and there is no incentive to manage an impression), it is likely that the self-reports of respondents with relatively high SDR scores are either accurate or distorted unconsciously. In contrast, when there are strong situational demands for favorable self-presentation (i.e., the questions contained in the survey are sensitive and public disclosure of

responses is possible, there are incentives to project a favorable image), respondents with high SDR scores also include those who may dissemble deliberately.

Marketing researchers will probably be most concerned about respondents deliberately distorting their answers to surveys in order to manage a certain impression. This will occur if situational demands for favorable self-presentation are high. To ascertain whether conscious SDR bias is a problem, the scores on the marketing construct of interest of respondents who are relatively high in SDR in the high demand situation (either ERT or MRT) should be compared across low and high demand conditions (either between- or within-subjects). If a construct is (not) susceptible to conscious misrepresentation, the distribution of scale scores obtained in the high demand situation should (not) be significantly different from the distribution obtained in the low demand situation (see also Pauls and Crost 2004, 2005).

When a marketing construct is significantly associated with an SDR scale under conditions of low demand, any bias, if it exists at all, is most likely due to unconscious distortion. If it is of interest to separate unconscious distortion from seemingly desirable but accurate responding, a different procedure is needed. At present, relatively little is known about the cognitive processes involved in SDR, but a study by Holtgraves (2004) indicates that unconscious distortion is a relatively automatic process. This suggests that a manipulation encouraging respondents to be more reflective and less impulsive may eliminate the distortion caused by unconscious SDR (see Strack and Deutsch, 2004, for similar arguments in a different context). Specifically, to ascertain whether unconscious SDR bias is a problem, the scores on the marketing construct of interest of respondents who are relatively high in SDR in the low demand situation (either ERT or MRT) should be compared across low demand and reflective mindset conditions (either between- or within-subjects). In the reflective mindset condition, respondents are encouraged to be more

mindful of their behavior, relative to the behavior of others or in relation to objective standards of behavior. For accurate responders (because they already respond truthfully), this comparison should make no difference, but for sincere self-deceivers distortion should decrease in the reflective mindset condition.

It should be emphasized that at this point no empirical evidence on the efficacy of the proposed reflective mindset manipulation is available. Research by Wilson and his colleagues (e.g., Wilson and Schooler 1991) has shown that introspection (analyzing the reasons for one's preferences, evaluating all attributes of different choice objects) can decrease the quality of preferences and decisions, so it is important to verify that reflection actually reduces nonconscious response distortion and does not introduce another bias.

--- Figure 2 about here ---

Effects of ERT and MRT on Marketing Scales: Empirical Evidence from the Global Study

Although a full illustration of the proposed procedure for distinguishing between substance and style is beyond the scope of this paper, we will briefly present some findings relevant to the first step. In order to ascertain whether there is a potential for SDR bias in marketing constructs, it is necessary to relate the marketing scale of interest to separate measures of ERT and MRT. Unfortunately, scale development in marketing has typically relied on the Marlowe-Crowne scale, so we know little about the (differential) effects of ERT and MRT on marketing constructs. We know even less about the effects of ERT and MRT in other countries as most scale development work has been carried out in the U.S.

We collected data for scales of 9 important marketing constructs: susceptibility to normative influence, innovativeness, deal proneness, nostalgia, quality consciousness, material success, environmental consciousness, consumer ethnocentrism, and health consciousness (see the Web

Appendix for details). We investigate potential SDR bias in these scales by regressing respondents' scores on the 9 marketing scales on their scores on ERT and MRT. We did this for each country and each scale separately since we were interested in the differential effects across countries. Figure 3 displays plots of the standardized regression coefficients for ERT and MRT.

--- Figure 3 about here ---

The plots show several interesting things. First, they reveal in which countries researchers can use a particular scale without having to worry about stylistic contamination (assuming that the conditions of scale administration are similar to the present study). Second, the plots identify country-marketing scale combinations where the effect of ERT or MRT exceeds the $|.2|$ cut-off. Interestingly, for most marketing scales, there is always a subset of countries in which there is a relatively strong relationship between the marketing scale and either ERT or MRT. This finding clearly underlines the importance of studying social desirability in cross-cultural survey research.

Third, there are no cases in which a substantive marketing scale exhibits a substantial relation with both ERT and MRT. In other words, marketing scales apparently share variance with either agency- or communion-related SDR but not both. Fourth, in the U.S., where most scales were developed, social desirability generally does not seem to contaminate scale scores, which increases our confidence in the validity of published findings in marketing. The only exceptions are material success (see Mick 1996 for a similar observation) and health consciousness.

In countries in which there is a nonnegligible relationship between a particular marketing scale and ERT/MRT, additional analyses as described earlier are required to determine whether scale scores are actually contaminated by SDR. Future research is necessary to provide more conclusive evidence about whether potential contamination translates into actual contamination

and, more generally, how effective the proposed experimental procedures are in identifying unconscious and deliberate distortion in marketing constructs.

DISCUSSION

Socially desirable responding has been of long-standing interest to the field of marketing. Unfortunately, the construct has not always been well-understood by marketing researchers, which has led to misconceptions and erroneous practices. The purpose of this paper was to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. We provided a review of the SDR literature organized around three key issues – the construct of SDR, the theoretical constellation of personality traits, values, sociodemographics, and cultural dimensions associated with SDR, and the vexing issue of substance versus style in SDR scales. We highlighted the “state of the literature”, identified unresolved issues, and presented results from an extensive global study to reinforce what is known and to address several unresolved issues. Importantly, our findings concerning the basic measurement characteristics and the theory-based constellation of related constructs provide strong support for the nomological validity of the ERT and MRT measures on a global basis.

Our study provides several concrete guidelines for marketing researchers. First, there are two distinct, content-based dimensions of socially desirable responding, grounded in different modalities of human experience, which are differentially affected by personal and cultural factors. Consequently, the use of the unidimensional Marlowe-Crowne scale should be discontinued. It confounds the two SDR dimensions and as such, it is unclear what it really measures. Instead, *future marketing research should include dedicated scales for ERT and MRT*, Paulhus’ BIDR scale being the preferred instrument. Our study supports the nomological validity of the BIDR in international applications, for countries ranging from France to China.

To facilitate implementation of this recommendation, the Web Appendix provides the translation of the 20-item short form of the BIDR in the 19 languages represented in our study.

Second, the assumption that a correlation between a marketing scale and an SDR measure invariably indicates contamination is unwarranted. Although a significant correlation between ERT or MRT and a substantive scale should be taken seriously because it may signal bias, it is necessary to conduct more detailed follow-up work to establish whether the observed association is due to substance or style. We outlined the contours of such a procedure. A corollary of the previous point is that the widespread practice in scale development research to purify scales by deleting items that correlate highly with SDR scales may actually *reduce* the construct validity of the scale, *unless it is established that this association is driven by style*.

Third, for *9 substantive marketing scales*, we identify in which countries *potential contamination* with ERT and MRT is minimal (Figure 3). In these countries, marketing researchers can use the scale in question without having to worry about possible SDR contamination. These marketing scales measure important constructs, and the countries included in our study cover over 80 percent of total global market research (*Marketing News* 2008). To facilitate use of these important scales outside the U.S., translations of the scale items are available upon request. We also identify those countries where SDR contamination might be an issue for the construct in question, and where a follow-up experiment is necessary before we can conclusively decide whether the substantial effect of ERT or MRT on that construct is primarily due to style or substance.

Suggestions for Future Research

Our cross-national empirical study sheds light on a number of unresolved issues (Table 1), but important issues remain. Our test of the theoretical constellation of SDR is based on main

effects. As such, it shares the limitation of previous research of being potentially susceptible to common method bias. Future research might address this issue by including interactions. The information on fixed versus random effects (Table 5) is useful in directing such research. For most traits and values, we found that the variance component was significant for either ERT and/or MRT. This indicates that the effect in question varies across countries. Work by Church (2000), Van de Vijver, Van Hemert, and Poortinga (2008) and others on how psychological constructs and culture interact in shaping people's responses to the environment may prove useful in developing a conceptual rationale for such cross-level interactions.

Currently available self-report measures of ERT and MRT cannot reliably distinguish between conscious and nonconscious SDR. It is unclear whether it is possible to construct such scales, but the issue certainly warrants more research before a conclusion can be reached. Further, one intriguing result was the unexpected negative effect of cultural individualism on ERT. Future research should probe more deeply the theoretical mechanisms underlying this effect, which probably requires experimental studies.

We proposed a new procedure to clarify the meaning of relationships between SDR scales and substantive marketing constructs, but only the first part of the procedure was illustrated with our data set. Future research should further develop, test, and refine the procedure in its entirety. One issue that is especially pertinent is whether the reflective mindset condition is effective in removing SDR bias.

Survey research would also benefit from a better understanding of when style is more important than substance, and vice versa. Such efforts could ultimately lead to informed predictions regarding SDR contamination versus substantive overlap in marketing scales. It is

also important to explore the reasons why particular countries exhibit substantial versus negligible effects of ERT or MRT on a specific marketing scale.

Although our samples were broadly representative on key sociodemographics, this does not guarantee that the samples were also representative on personality and values. If the relation between traits and values and willingness to participate in surveys differs across countries, this may also give rise to country differences. Future research could attempt to investigate this issue.

Much remains to be studied before we have more definitive answers about whether or not social desirability is a serious problem in survey research, but we hope that our paper provides an impetus to other marketing researchers to make SDR the focus of some of their own work.

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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF THE STATE OF THE LITERATURE AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

| Issue | State of the literature | Unresolved issues¹⁾ |
|--|---|--|
| <i>SDR construct & its measurement</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socially desirable responding (SDR) consists of two moderately positively correlated dimensions, egoistic response tendencies (ERT) and moralistic response tendencies (MRT) • Both ERT and MRT can be conscious or nonconscious • The self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) and impression management (IM) subscales of the BIDR are useful measures of ERT and MRT, respectively | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Little is known about the reliability and nomological validity of SDE and IM around the world</i> • Currently available self-report measures of ERT and MRT cannot reliably distinguish between conscious and nonconscious SDR – it is unclear whether it is possible to construct such scales |
| <i>Constellation of SDR</i> | | |
| Personality Traits | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Openness to experience and extraversion are positively related to ERT • Conscientiousness and agreeableness are positively related to MRT • Conscientiousness has a positive secondary association with ERT • Emotional stability is positively related to ERT and exhibits a positive secondary relation with MRT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Openness to experience is expected to be a key driver of ERT but the empirical evidence is weak</i> • <i>Conscientiousness should be more strongly related to MRT than to ERT, but the empirical evidence does not support this</i> • <i>There is little research showing the cross-national generalizability of the predicted effects</i> • <i>Reliance on bivariate correlations as a measure of the strength of relationships ignores interdependencies among the Big Five traits</i> |
| Values | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Openness to change (horizontal idiocentrism) is positively related to ERT • Self-transcendence (horizontal allocentrism) is positively related to MRT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Self-enhancement is expected to be positively related to ERT but the empirical evidence does not support this</i> • <i>Conservation is expected to be positively related to MRT but no supporting empirical evidence is available</i> • <i>Little is known about the effect of values vis-à-vis traits</i> |
| Sociodemographics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Males are higher on ERT • Females are higher on MRT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Little is known about the relation between ERT and MRT and other sociodemographics</i> • <i>Little is known about the effect of a person's sociodemographics vis-a-vis the person's psychological make-up (traits, values)</i> |
| National Culture | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individualistic countries are lower on MRT and appear to be higher on ERT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Except for some research on individualism, little is known about the cultural correlates of ERT</i> |
| <i>Style v. substance</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDR measures contain both stylistic variance and substantive information • The marketing practice of deleting items in scale development that are correlated with SDR may reduce scale validity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Little is known about the effects of ERT and MRT on substantive marketing scales – especially outside of the U.S.</i> • Efficacy of procedures to separate substance from style in marketing scales remains to be studied |

¹⁾ Unsolved issues that are investigated in our global study are shown in italics.

TABLE 2
ITEMS FROM THE BALANCED INVENTORY OF DESIRABLE RESPONDING
USED IN GLOBAL STUDY

Egoistic Response Tendencies (ERT)

My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. (*)
I have not always been honest with myself. (*)
I always know why I like things.
Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. (*)
I never regret my decisions.
I rarely appreciate criticism. (*)
I am very confident of my judgments.
I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. (*)

Moralistic Response Tendencies (MRT)

I sometimes tell lies if I have to. (*)
I never cover up my mistakes.
I always obey laws, even if I am unlikely to get caught.
I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. (*)
When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. (*)
When I was young I sometimes stole things. (*)
I have done things that I don't tell other people about. (*)
I never take things that don't belong to me.
I don't gossip about other people's business.

Note: (*) indicates a negatively keyed item.

TABLE 3
 CORRELATIONS OF EGOISTIC AND MORALISTIC RESPONSE TENDENCIES WITH THE
 BIG FIVE PERSONALITY TRAITS: SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

| Study | Egoistic Response Tendencies (ERT) | | | | | Moralistic Response Tendencies (MRT) | | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | O | E | ES | C | A | O | E | ES | C | A |
| Barrick and Mount (1996; n=147) | .32 | .25 | .54 | .29 | .24 | .25 | .01 | .43 | .26 | .23 |
| Barrick and Mount (1996; n=139) | .17 | .22 | .35 | .24 | .17 | .39 | .12 | .44 | .39 | .42 |
| Konstabel et al. (2006; n =210-217) | .09 | .42 | .64 | .45 | -.03 | -.15 | -.02 | .27 | .46 | .58 |
| McFarland and Ryan (2006; n=547) | .21 | .24 | .36 | .25 | .06 | .13 | .16 | .29 | .27 | .31 |
| Meston et al. (1998; females, n=296) | .26 | .21 | .40 | .37 | .17 | -.01 | -.00 | .13 | .28 | .36 |
| Meston et al. (1998; males, n=208) | .19 | .21 | .32 | .30 | .10 | -.06 | .05 | .13 | .22 | .12 |
| Paulhus and Reid (1991; n=137) | .09 | .29 | .30 | .05 | .11 | .01 | .04 | .07 | .08 | .18 |
| Pauls and Stemmler (2003; n=67) | .02 | .36 | .39 | .23 | .05 | -.19 | -.06 | .12 | .41 | .30 |
| Pauls and Crost (2005; n=155) | -.08 | .23 | .56 | .34 | -.02 | -.06 | .03 | .24 | .33 | .27 |
| Reid-Seiser and Fritzsche (2001; n=72-75) | .17 | .27 | .58 | .52 | -.06 | .07 | .07 | .27 | .25 | .30 |
| Roth and Herzberg (2007; n=326) | -.11 | .27 | .66 | .42 | .18 | -.11 | .02 | .13 | .21 | .36 |
| Average correlation | .13 | .26 | .46 | .32 | .10 | .03 | .05 | .23 | .28 | .32 |
| 95% confidence interval | (.05, .21) | (.23, .30) | (.38, .54) | (.26, .38) | (.04, .15) | (-.06, .11) | (.00, .09) | (.16, .29) | (.23, .33) | (.26, .39) |

Note: O = Openness to experience, E = Extraversion, ES = Emotional Stability, C = Conscientiousness, A = Agreeableness. Correlations that are significant at $p=.05$ (two-sided) are shown in bold. In case a study reports correlations for “standard” and “special” conditions (e.g., fake good), we report the results for the standard condition. Average correlations and confidence intervals are sample-size weighted.

TABLE 4
 RELIABILITY AND POOLED CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCE VARIABLES

| | Av. rel. | Range in rel. | ERT | MRT | O | E | ES | C | A | Cons | Open | SelfTran | SelfEnh | Gender | Age | Educ |
|----------|----------|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|------------|-----------|------------|---------|--------|------|------|
| ERT | .67 | .49-.76 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MRT | .73 | .67-.77 | .30 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| O | .72 | .66-.76 | .22 | .05 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E | .74 | .62-.80 | .12 | .01 | .28 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| ES | .75 | .68-.84 | .20 | .15 | .13 | .19 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| C | .73 | .64-.77 | .19 | .21 | .19 | .19 | .22 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| A | .70 | .65-.76 | .08 | .24 | .22 | .22 | .21 | .42 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Cons | .80 | .72-.85 | .11 | .24 | .01 | .01 | .06 | .18 | .24 | 1 | | | | | | |
| Open | .81 | .73-.85 | .09 | -.0 | .34 | .21 | .13 | .06 | .09 | .44 (-.19) | 1 | | | | | |
| SelfTran | .86 | .79-.89 | .10 | .24 | .21 | .10 | .07 | .18 | .34 | .72 (.66) | .58 (.48) | 1 | | | | |
| SelfEnh | .81 | .68-.85 | .10 | .01 | .07 | .10 | .06 | .07 | -.02 | .54 (.45) | .56 (.48) | .38 (-.24) | 1 | | | |
| Gender | | | -.05 | .05 | -.04 | .10 | .18 | .02 | .10 | .01 | -.01 | .09 | -.04 | 1 | | |
| Age | | | .04 | .20 | -.08 | -.06 | -.07 | .18 | .11 | .19 | -.14 | .13 | -.06 | -.07 | 1 | |
| Educ | | | .01 | -.05 | .23 | .06 | -.04 | .15 | .08 | -.17 | .06 | -.04 | -.08 | -.05 | -.02 | 1 |
| S-Class | | | .03 | -.06 | .15 | .10 | -.08 | .08 | .01 | -.08 | .07 | -.03 | .03 | -.02 | -.05 | .29 |

Note: O = Openness to experience, E = Extraversion, ES = Emotional Stability, C = Conscientiousness, A = Agreeableness, Cons=Conservation, Open = Openness to Change, Self-Tran = Self-Transcendence, Self-Enh = Self-Enhancement. In parentheses we report partial correlations as recommended by Schwartz (1992).

TABLE 5
EFFECTS ON EGOISTIC AND MORALISTIC RESPONSE TENDENCIES


| Parameter | Egoistic Response Tendencies (ERT) | | | Moralistic Response Tendencies (MRT) | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------|------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------|
| | Estimate | t-value/ χ^2 | p | Estimate | t-value/ χ^2 | p |
| Structural parameters | | | | | | |
| Intercept (γ_{00}) | .5083 | 21.34 | <.01 | .5772 | 20.65 | <.01 |
| <i>Personality Traits</i> | | | | | | |
| Openness (γ_{10}) | .0258 | 6.58 | <.01 | .0188 | 1.92 | n.s. |
| Extraversion (γ_{20}) | .0181 | 5.25 | <.01 | -.0202 | -2.24 | <.05 |
| Emotional Stability (γ_{30}) | .0491 | 7.64 | <.01 | .0210 | 3.10 | <.01 |
| Conscientiousness (γ_{40}) | .0694 | 7.73 | <.01 | .1714 | 18.60 | <.01 |
| Agreeableness (γ_{50}) | .0011 | .24 | n.s. | .1226 | 11.12 | <.01 |
| <i>Values</i> | | | | | | |
| Self-enhancement (γ_{60}) | .0061 | 2.79 | <.01 | -.0609 | -12.34 | <.01 |
| Openness to Change (γ_{70}) | .0060 | 3.11 | <.01 | -.0557 | -12.03 | <.01 |
| Self-transcendence (γ_{80}) | .0029 | 1.07 | n.s. | .1010 | 15.60 | <.01 |
| Conservation (γ_{90}) | .0023 | 1.15 | n.s. | .0519 | 9.05 | <.01 |
| <i>Sociodemographics</i> | | | | | | |
| Gender (γ_{100}) (1=women) | -.0131 | -4.37 | <.01 | .0281 | 2.70 | <.01 |
| Age (γ_{110}) | .0006 | 3.75 | <.01 | .0038 | 9.57 | <.01 |
| Education (γ_{120}) | -.0044 | -2.29 | <.05 | .0095 | 1.96 | <.05 |
| Social Class (γ_{130}) | -.0005 | -.21 | n.s. | -.0014 | -.37 | n.s. |
| <i>National culture</i> | | | | | | |
| Individualism/Collectivism (γ_{01}) | -.0016 | -2.05 | <.05 | -.0020 | -2.49 | <.05 |
| Masculinity/Femininity (γ_{02}) | .0005 | 1.42 | <.10 | -.0007 | -1.48 | <.10 |
| Variance components | | | | | | |
| Openness (τ_{11}) | .00032 | 61.28 | <.01 | Fixed | | |
| Extraversion (τ_{22}) | .00021 | 58.46 | <.01 | .00085 | 50.39 | <.01 |
| Emotional Stability (τ_{33}) | .00108 | 292.22 | <.01 | .00041 | 38.40 | <.05 |
| Conscientiousness (τ_{44}) | .00198 | 325.34 | <.01 | Fixed | | |
| Agreeableness (τ_{55}) | .00043 | 52.08 | <.01 | .00137 | 51.84 | <.01 |
| Self-enhancement (τ_{66}) | .00008 | 63.80 | <.01 | Fixed | | |
| Openness to Change (τ_{77}) | Fixed | | | Fixed | | |
| Self-transcendence (τ_{88}) | .00007 | 46.47 | <.01 | Fixed | | |
| Conservation (τ_{99}) | Fixed | | | Fixed | | |
| Gender (τ_{1010}) | Fixed | | | Fixed | | |
| Age (τ_{1111}) | .00000 | 65.68 | <.01 | .00000 | 67.48 | <.01 |
| Education (τ_{1212}) | .00006 | 51.63 | <.01 | Fixed | | |
| Social Class (τ_{1313}) | .00008 | 49.87 | <.01 | Fixed | | |
| Explained variance | | | | | | |
| Individual-level | 27.0 % | | | 25.3 % | | |
| Country-level | 28.5 % | | | 18.3 % | | |

Note: n.s. = not significant at $p = .05$; for national-culture effects, we use $p < .10$ as the cut-off because there are only 23 degrees of freedom for these parameters. A variance component is fixed if the variance of the coefficient in question is not significantly different from zero. This implies that the effect is the same across countries. T-values are reported for the structural coefficients, χ^2 values for the variance components.

TABLE 6
 RELATIVE EFFECTS OF BIG FIVE AND VALUE DOMAINS ON ERT AND MRT

| | Change in Explained Variance | |
|--|------------------------------|------------|
| | ERT | MRT |
| <i>Sociodemos + Big Five + Values</i> | | |
| Step 1: Sociodemographics | 2.4% | 5.7% |
| Step 2: Big Five | 22.5% | 13.9% |
| Step 3: Value Domains | 1.9% | 5.7% |
| <i>Sociodemos + Values + Big Five</i> | | |
| Step 1: Sociodemographics | 2.4% | 5.7% |
| Step 2: Value Domains | 5.1% | 9.5% |
| Step 3: Big Five | 19.5% | 10.1% |
| <i>Range in explained variance</i> | | |
| Big Five | 19.5-22.5% | 10.1-13.9% |
| Value Domains | 1.9-5.1% | 5.7-9.5% |
| <i>Variance explained by psychological makeup (personality and values)</i> | | |
| | 24.6% | 19.6% |

FIGURE 1
 COUNTRY SCORES ON ERT AND MRT



Note: Scores are indexed relative to the USA (=100) on both dimensions

FIGURE 2
PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND STYLE







FIGURE 3

PLOTS OF WITHIN-COUNTRY STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF ERT AND MRT FOR NINE SUBSTANTIVE MARKETING SCALES






Health consciousness




Environmental Consciousness



DO NOT



Quality Consciousness




Nostalgia



DO NOT

Deal proneness



DO NOT

Socially Desirable Response Tendencies in Survey Research

Web-Appendix

Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp, Martijn G. de Jong, and Hans Baumgartner

In this appendix, we provide additional information on the data collection, sample composition, reliabilities and correlations of ERT and MRT, and the items used to measure the big five traits and SDR.

CROSS-NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION

Samples

Two global market research agencies, GfK and Taylor Nelson Sofres, collected the data in 26 countries around the world: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, UK, and the U.S. The sample in each country was drawn so as to be broadly representative of the total population in terms of region, age, education, and gender. For countries with a high penetration of the Internet, a web survey was used. In countries with a low Internet penetration, we employed mall intercepts using the same questionnaire layout. The number of respondents per country varied between 355 (U.K.) and 1,181 (U.S.). The total number of respondents was 12,424.

Measures

The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into all local languages using backtranslation. Modifications were made based on discussions with backtranslators and the market research agencies to maintain consistency across all countries.

ERT and MRT were measured with the self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) and impression management (IM) subscales of Paulhus' (1991) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). The BIDR consists of 20 SDE and 20 IM items, but the market research agencies considered the full 40-item scale too long and too costly to administer. We therefore selected a subset of 10 SDE and 10 IM items by omitting potentially offensive and/or inappropriate items while retaining the balanced structure of the scale (five positively and five negatively worded items per SDR dimension). Five-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) were used to collect the ratings.

We used the Big Five Inventory to measure the five personality factors of interest. For each Big Five factor, we selected three highly loading positively and negatively worded items (in the case of openness to experience, this was not possible and we used four positively worded items), based on the cross-cultural study of Benet-Martinez and John

(1998). Responses were collected using five-point Likert scales. The 30 items were in the same part of the questionnaire, but their order was randomized.

Schwartz (1992, Schwartz and Sagiv 1995) developed and extensively tested the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), consisting of 45 values, covering all value types. The SVS exhibits a high level of consistency in motivational meaning across cultures and is recommended for cross-national research (Schwartz and Sagiv 1995). We adhered to Schwartz (1992) in terms of instructions, item format, and response scale used (ranging from -1 to 7).

In addition to gender (1=female, 0=male), we included age, education, and social class as sociodemographic control variables. Age was measured in years and education using categories of no formal education, education up to age 12, 14, 16, or 18, higher education, and university. Respondents were also asked to classify themselves into one of six social class categories: lower, working, lower-middle, middle, upper-middle, and upper class. The age of the respondents ranged from 16 to 91 years, with a mean of 40, and 46 percent were female.

We collected data on 9 substantive marketing scales: susceptibility to normative influence (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989), innovativeness (Steenkamp and Gielens 2003), deal proneness (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton 1995), nostalgia (Holbrook and Schindler 1994), quality consciousness (Steenkamp 1989), material success (Richins and Dawson 1992), environmental consciousness (Grunert and Juhl 1995), consumer ethnocentrism (Shimp and Sharma 1987), and health consciousness (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001). Although all items were taken from validated scales, only a subset of the complete collection of items was used in most cases because of time constraints and the desire to avoid overburdening respondents (Burisch 1984). The items were listed randomly in the survey instrument, and responses were measured using five-point Likert scales.

Country ratings on individualism/collectivism and masculinity/femininity were taken from Hofstede (2001).

Sample composition

The sample composition was as follows:

| SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------|---------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|
| Country | <i>N</i> | % males | Average age (st. dev.) | % higher education ^a | Survey style |
| Argentina | 396 | 48.6 | 45 (17) | 22.7 | Hard copy |
| Austria | 392 | 63.9 | 38 (14) | 54.2 | Internet |
| Belgium | 508 | 48.4 | 40 (16) | 60.6 | Internet |
| Brazil | 394 | 49.7 | 35 (16) | 4.5 | Hard copy |
| China (mainland) | 412 | 50.1 | 39 (15) | 39.9 | Mall intercept |
| Czech Republic | 488 | 49.3 | 35 (13) | 59.0 | Internet |
| Denmark | 517 | 44.3 | 38 (12) | 73.2 | Internet |
| France | 402 | 49.0 | 42 (16) | 64.4 | Internet |
| Germany | 638 | 60.0 | 37 (17) | 60.5 | Internet |
| Hungary | 576 | 54.9 | 38 (11) | 52.9 | Internet |
| Ireland | 548 | 47.3 | 36 (11) | 75.7 | Internet |
| Italy | 397 | 64.2 | 40 (13) | 65.0 | Internet |
| Netherlands | 503 | 55.0 | 45 (15) | 61.9 | Internet |
| Norway | 547 | 59.9 | 41 (13) | 68.3 | Internet |
| Poland | 391 | 48.1 | 43 (18) | 11.5 | Hardcopy |
| Portugal | 434 | 64.9 | 31 (11) | 59.7 | Internet |
| Romania | 431 | 49.7 | 37 (18) | 24.4 | Hard copy |
| Russia | 389 | 44.4 | 40 (19) | 57.6 | Mall intercept |
| Slovakia | 378 | 52.8 | 40 (16) | 48.5 | Internet |
| Spain | 544 | 56.4 | 31 (11) | 79.3 | Internet |
| Sweden | 418 | 51.3 | 37 (14) | 56.8 | Internet |
| Switzerland | 393 | 60.8 | 35 (15) | 57.5 | Internet |
| Thailand | 402 | 53.2 | 35 (12) | 29.9 | Hard copy |
| Ukraine | 393 | 46.8 | 37 (17) | 65.4 | Mall intercept |
| United Kindom | 355 | 68.7 | 43 (15) | 58.3 | Internet |
| United States | 1181 | 59.1 | 49 (18) | 78.2 | Internet |

^a % of people having received higher education / university

Reliabilities, Intercorrelations, and means for ERT and MRT

| | r(ERT, MRT) | Reliability | | Mean Scores (index) ¹⁾ | |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|---------|-----------------------------------|--------|
| | | ERT | MRT | ERT | MRT |
| Argentina | .28 | .65 | .71 | 111 | 127 |
| Austria | .39 | .69 | .73 | 102 | 74 |
| Belgium | .42 | .71 | .75 | 117 | 69 |
| Brazil | .25 | .66 | .72 | 89 | 64 |
| China | .41 | .69 | .70 | 130 | 144 |
| Czech Republic | .32 | .70 | .72 | 114 | 97 |
| Denmark | .25 | .68 | .71 | 92 | 75 |
| France | .28 | .67 | .71 | 92 | 87 |
| Germany | .31 | .70 | .71 | 79 | 58 |
| Hungary | .35 | .68 | .72 | 176 | 102 |
| Ireland | .29 | .68 | .76 | 64 | 57 |
| Italy | .33 | .70 | .73 | 135 | 94 |
| Netherlands | .31 | .71 | .76 | 128 | 73 |
| Norway | .29 | .69 | .75 | 90 | 91 |
| Poland | .29 | .67 | .74 | 131 | 140 |
| Portugal | .30 | .66 | .73 | 131 | 111 |
| Romania | .43 | .65 | .73 | 130 | 114 |
| Russia | .32 | .64 | .74 | 81 | 111 |
| Slovakia | .35 | .65 | .74 | 101 | 74 |
| Spain | .39 | .71 | .74 | 148 | 89 |
| Sweden | .22 | .76 | .75 | 93 | 74 |
| Switzerland | .19 | .65 | .70 | 82 | 67 |
| Thailand | .35 | .49 | .67 | 99 | 123 |
| UK | .25 | .66 | .77 | 63 | 57 |
| Ukraine | .25 | .65 | .69 | 107 | 101 |
| USA | .30 | .65 | .74 | 100 | 100 |
| Range | .19-.43 | .49-.76 | .67-.77 | 63-176 | 57-144 |

¹⁾ Index is relative to the U.S. (=100)

MEASURES

Big Five

I See Myself as Someone Who ...

Openness

Is original, comes up with new ideas.
Has an active imagination.
Is inventive.
Values artistic, aesthetic experiences.
Has few artistic interests. (*)
Prefers work that is routine. (*)

Conscientiousness

Does a thorough job.
Can be somewhat careless. (*)
Tends to be disorganized. (*)
Tends to be lazy. (*)
Does things efficiently.
Makes plans and follows through with them.

Extraversion

Is talkative.
Generates a lot of enthusiasm.
Is reserved. (*)
Tends to be quiet. (*)
Is sometimes shy, inhibited. (*)
Is outgoing, sociable.

Agreeableness

Is helpful and unselfish with others.
Starts quarrels with others. (*)
Can be cold and aloof. (*)
Is considerate and kind to almost everyone.
Likes to cooperate with others.
Is sometimes rude to others. (*)

Neuroticism

Is relaxed, handles stress well. (*)
Can be tense.
Worries a lot.
Is emotionally stable, not easily upset. (*)
Remains calm in tense situations. (*)

SDR MEASURES

SDE items (Dutch / Flemish)

| |
|--|
| 1. Mijn eerste indruk van mensen blijkt meestal te kloppen. |
| 2. Het zou moeilijk voor me zijn om één van mijn slechte gewoonten op te geven. |
| 3. Ik ben niet altijd eerlijk tegenover mezelf geweest. |
| 4. Ik weet altijd waarom ik iets leuk vind. |
| 5. Als ik eenmaal iets heb besloten lukt het anderen maar zelden om mij van gedachten te laten veranderen. |
| 6. Het is moeilijk voor mij om een storende gedachte uit mijn hoofd te zetten. |
| 7. Ik heb nooit spijt van mijn beslissingen. |
| 8. Ik waardeer kritiek zelden. |
| 9. Ik ben erg zeker van mijn oordeel. |
| 10. Ik weet niet altijd waarom ik de dingen doe die ik doe. |

SDE items (French)

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| 1. Mes premières impressions sur les gens se révèlent généralement bonnes. |
| 2. Ce serait difficile pour moi de me libérer d'une de mes mauvaises habitudes. |
| 3. Je n'ai pas toujours été honnête avec moi-même. |
| 4. Je sais toujours pourquoi j'aime les choses. |
| 5. A partir du moment où je me suis fait une idée, les gens peuvent rarement me faire changer d'opinion. |
| 6. Il m'est difficile de chasser une pensée dérangeante. |
| 7. Je ne regrette jamais mes décisions. |
| 8. J'apprécie rarement la critique. |
| 9. J'ai beaucoup de confiance en mes jugements. |
| 10. Je ne sais pas toujours pourquoi je fais les choses que je fais. |

IM items (Dutch / Flemish)

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|--|
| 11. Ik lieg soms als het moet. |
| 12. Ik verberg mijn fouten nooit. |
| 13. Ik gehoorzaam de wet altijd, ook als het onwaarschijnlijk is dat ik word gepakt. |
| 14. Ik heb wel eens iets naars gezegd over een vriend achter zijn rug om. |
| 15. Als ik mensen vertrouwelijk hoor praten probeer ik niet mee te luisteren. |
| 16. Ik heb wel eens te veel wisselgeld ontvangen van een verkoper zonder het hem of haar te vertellen. |
| 17. Toen ik jong was heb ik soms dingen gestolen. |
| 18. Ik heb dingen gedaan waar ik andere mensen niets over vertel. |
| 19. Ik neem nooit dingen mee die niet van mij zijn. |
| 20. Ik roddel niet over andermans zaken. |

IM items (French)

| |
|--|
| 11. Si je le dois, Je dis parfois des mensonges . |
| 12. Je ne cache jamais mes erreurs. |
| 13. J'obéis toujours aux lois même s'il est peu probable que je me laisse prendre. |
| 14. Parfois, j'ai déjà dit quelque chose de mal derrière le dos d'un ami. |
| 15. Quand j'entends des gens parler en privé, j'évite d'écouter. |
| 16. Il m'est déjà arrivé de ne rien dire quand un vendeur me rend trop de monnaie. |
| 17. Quand j'étais jeune, j'ai parfois volé des choses. |
| 18. J'ai fait des choses dont je ne parle à personne. |
| 19. Je ne prends jamais de choses qui ne m'appartiennent pas. |
| 20. Je ne médis pas sur les affaires des autres. |

SDE items (German)

| |
|---|
| 1. Mein erster Eindruck von Menschen erweist sich oft als richtig. |
| 2. Es wäre schwierig für mich, irgendeine meiner schlechten Gewohnheiten aufzugeben. |
| 3. Ich bin nicht immer ehrlich zu mir selbst gewesen. |
| 4. Ich weiß immer, warum ich Sachen mag. |
| 5. Wenn ich mich einmal entschieden habe, können andere Menschen selten meine Meinung ändern. |
| 6. Es fällt mir schwer, störende Gedanken auszublenden. |
| 7. Ich bereue meine Entscheidungen nie. |
| 8. Ich werde ungern kritisiert. |
| 9. Ich habe großes Vertrauen in meine eigenen Urteile. |
| 10. Ich kenne nicht immer die Gründe für meine Handlungen. |

SDE items (China)

| |
|--------------------------|
| 1. 我對別人的第一印象通常是準確的。 |
| 2. 我很難戒除我的壞習慣。 |
| 3. 我不經常對自己誠實。 |
| 4. 我常常知道為什麼我喜歡東西。 |
| 5. 當我作出決定之後,其他人很難改變我的主意。 |
| 6. 要停止我紛亂的思想,我感到十分之困難。 |
| 7. 我對我所作出的決定從不後悔。 |
| 8. 我甚少多謝那些批評。 |
| 9. 我對我的判斷非常有信心。 |
| 10. 我常常都不知道我做事情的原因。 |

IM items (German)

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|--|
| 11. Ich lüge gelegentlich, wenn ich muss. |
| 12. Ich verdecke nie meine Fehler. |
| 13. Ich bin immer gesetzestreu, auch dann, wenn ich kaum erwischt werden kann. |
| 14. Ich habe einmal schlecht über Freunde hinter deren Rücken geredet. |
| 15. Wenn ich höre, dass Leute über private Angelegenheiten sprechen, vermeide ich es mitzuhören. |
| 16. Ich habe einmal zuviel Wechselgeld vom Ladenangestellten bekommen, ohne es ihm zu sagen. |
| 17. Als ich jung war, habe ich manchmal Sachen gestohlen. |
| 18. Ich habe Sachen getan, von denen ich niemandem erzähle. |
| 19. Ich nehme niemals Dinge an mich, die mir nicht gehören. |
| 20. Ich tratsche nicht über anderer Leute Angelegenheiten. |

IM items (China)

| |
|--------------------------|
| 11. 在有需要時,我也會說謊。 |
| 12. 我從不掩飾我的錯誤。 |
| 13. 我時常遵守法律,即使我不大可能被抓住。 |
| 14. 我曾經在我的朋友背後說他/她的壞話。 |
| 15. 當我聽到別人在談論私事時,我會避免聆聽。 |
| 16. 店員曾經找多錢給我,我没有告訴他/她。 |
| 17. 當我小的時候,我有時候會偷東西。 |
| 18. 我做過一些不會向別人提及的事。 |
| 19. 我從不拿取不屬於自己的東西。 |
| 20. 我不會說別人的閒話。 |

SDE items (Denmark)

| |
|---|
| 1. Mit første indtryk af folk viser sig som regel at holde stik. |
| 2. Det vil være svært for mig at bryde nogle af mine dårlige vaner. |
| 3. Jeg har ikke altid været ærlig over for mig selv. |
| 4. Jeg ved altid, hvorfor jeg godt kan lide ting. |
| 5. Når jeg først har truffet en beslutning, kan andre sjældent få mig til at skifte mening. |
| 6. Jeg har svært ved at abstrahere fra en urolige tanke. |
| 7. Jeg fortryder aldrig mine beslutninger. |
| 8. Jeg sætter sjældent pris på kritik. |
| 9. Jeg har stor tillid til min dømmekraft. |
| 10. Jeg ved ikke altid, hvorfor jeg gør de ting, jeg gør. |

SDE items (Russia)

| |
|--|
| 1. Мои первые впечатления о людях обычно оказываются верными. |
| 2. Мне было бы трудно бросить любую из моих плохих привычек. |
| 3. Я не всегда бываю честен сам с собой. |
| 4. Я всегда знаю, за что я люблю какие-либо вещи. |
| 5. Если я что-то для себя решил, другим людям редко удается изменить мое мнение. |
| 6. Мне трудно избавиться от какой-либо беспокоящей мысли. |
| 7. Я никогда не сожалею о своих решениях. |
| 8. Я редко ценю критику. |
| 9. Я очень уверен в своих суждениях. |
| 10. Я не всегда знаю причину того, что делаю. |

IM items (Denmark)

| |
|---|
| 11. Jeg lyver nogle gange, hvis det er nødvendigt. |
| 12. Jeg dækker aldrig over mine fejltagelser. |
| 13. Jeg overholder altid lovene, også selvom det er usandsynligt, at jeg skulle blive opdaget. |
| 14. Jeg har på et tidspunkt sagt noget dårligt om en ven bag hans eller hendes ryg. |
| 15. Når jeg hører folk tale privat, undlader jeg at lytte. |
| 16. Jeg har på et tidspunkt modtaget for mange byttepenge fra en ekspedient uden at sige noget til ham eller hende. |
| 17. Da jeg var ung, stjal jeg somme tider ting. |
| 18. Jeg har gjort ting, som jeg ikke fortæller andre om. |
| 19. Jeg tager aldrig ting, som ikke tilhører mig. |
| 20. Jeg sladrer ikke om andre folks affærer. |

IM items (Russia)

| |
|---|
| 11. Я иногда говорю неправду, если мне приходится это делать. |
| 12. Я никогда не скрываю своих ошибок. |
| 13. Я никогда не нарушаю законы, даже если нет вероятности того, что меня не поймают. |
| 14. Я говорил что-либо плохое о моем друге за его спиной. |
| 15. Если я слышу людей, ведущих личную беседу, я стараюсь их не слушать. |
| 16. Я получил слишком большую сдачу от продавца и не сказал ему об этом. |
| 17. Когда я был молодым, я иногда воровал вещи. |
| 18. Я совершал поступки, о которых никому не говорил. |
| 19. Я никогда не беру чужих вещей. |
| 20. Я не сплетничаю о делах других людей. |

SDE items (Argentina)

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|--|
| 1. Mis primeras impresiones sobre la gente suelen ser acertadas. |
| 2. Me sería difícil romper con cualquiera de mis malos hábitos. |
| 3. No siempre he sido sincero conmigo mismo. |
| 4. Siempre sé por qué me gustan las cosas. |
| 5. Una vez que me decido, es muy difícil que alguien me haga cambiar de opinión. |
| 6. Me resulta difícil apartar un pensamiento perturbador. |
| 7. Nunca me arrepiento de mis decisiones. |
| 8. Raramente agradezco las críticas. |
| 9. Me fío mucho de mis deducciones. |
| 10. No siempre sé por qué motivos hago las cosas. |

SDE items (Italy)

| |
|---|
| 1. Le mie prime impressioni sulle persone si rivelano generalmente corrette. |
| 2. Sarebbe difficile per me abbandonare le mie cattive abitudini. |
| 3. Non sono sempre stato onesto con me stesso. |
| 4. So sempre perché mi piace una cosa. |
| 5. Una volta che ho preso una decisione, le altre persone raramente possono cambiare la mia opinione. |
| 6. È difficile per me allontanare un pensiero preoccupante. |
| 7. Non mi pento mai delle mie decisioni. |
| 8. Raramente apprezzo le critiche. |
| 9. Mi fido molto dei miei giudizi. |
| 10. Non sempre so il perché di quello che faccio. |

IM items (Argentina)

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|--|
| 11. A veces miento si tengo que hacerlo. |
| 12. Nunca oculto mis errores. |
| 13. Siempre obedezco las leyes, incluso aunque sea difícil que me descubran. |
| 14. He hablado alguna vez mal de un amigo a sus espaldas. |
| 15. Cuando oigo a la gente teniendo una conversación privada, intento no escucharla. |
| 16. Si un vendedor me ha dado cambio de más, algunas veces no digo nada. |
| 17. Cuando era joven, a veces robaba cosas. |
| 18. He hecho cosas de las que no le he hablado a nadie. |
| 19. Nunca cojo cosas que no me pertenezcan. |
| 20. No soy chismoso sobre los asuntos de otras personas. |

IM items (Italy)

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| 11. Alcune volte dico bugie se sono costretto a farlo. |
| 12. Non nascondo mai i miei errori. |
| 13. Rispetto sempre le leggi, anche se fosse difficile essere "beccato". |
| 14. Qualche volta ho parlato alle spalle di un amico. |
| 15. Quando sento le persone parlare in privato, evito di ascoltare. |
| 16. Qualche volta è capitato di aver ricevuto più resto del dovuto da un commerciante senza dirglielo. |
| 17. Quando ero ragazzo, mi è capitato di rubare qualcosa. |
| 18. Ho fatto delle cose che non ho detto ad altri. |
| 19. Non prendo mai cose che non mi appartengono. |
| 20. Non faccio pettegolezzi sugli affari degli altri. |

SDE items (Norway)

| |
|---|
| 1. Mitt førsteinntrykk av mennesker er ofte riktig. |
| 2. Det vil være vanskelig for meg å gi slipp på mine uvaner. |
| 3. Jeg har ikke alltid vært ærlig med meg selv. |
| 4. Jeg vet alltid hvorfor jeg liker ting. |
| 5. Har jeg først bestemt meg, er det sjelden at andre klarer å forandre min mening. |
| 6. Det er vanskelig for meg å stenge av urolige tanker. |
| 7. Jeg angrer aldri på mine beslutninger. |
| 8. Jeg setter sjelden pris på kritikk. |
| 9. Jeg er meget sikker i mine bedømminger. |
| 10. Jeg vet ikke alltid grunnen til at jeg gjør som jeg gjør. |

SDE items (Brazil)

| |
|--|
| 1. As minhas primeiras impressões sobre as pessoas, acabam normalmente por se tornar corretas. |
| 2. Seria muito difícil para mim quebrar com os meus maus hábitos. |
| 3. Nem sempre fui honesto comigo mesmo. |
| 4. Sei sempre porque gosto das coisas. |
| 5. Depois de ter formulado uma opinião, raramente as outras pessoas conseguem mudá-la. |
| 6. É difícil para mim afastar um pensamento perturbador. |
| 7. Nunca me arrependo das minhas decisões. |
| 8. Raramente aprecio críticas. |
| 9. Tenho muita confiança nos meus julgamentos. |
| 10. Nem sempre sei as razões pelas quais faço as coisas que faço. |

IM items (Norway)

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|--|
| 11. Jeg lyver noen ganger hvis jeg må. |
| 12. Jeg skjuler aldri mine feiltagelser. |
| 13. Jeg følger alltid loven, selv om det er liten risiko for å bli tatt. |
| 14. Det har skjedd at jeg har snakket stygt om en venn bak hans/hennes rygg. |
| 15. Når jeg overhører mennesker snakke om noe privat, unngår jeg å lytte . |
| 16. Det har skjedd at jeg har mottatt for mye vekslepenger tilbake fra en selger uten å si ifra til han eller henne. |
| 17. Da jeg var yngre, hendte det at jeg stjal. |
| 18. Jeg har gjort saker og ting jeg ikke forteller andre personer om. |
| 19. Jeg tar aldri ting som ikke tilhører meg. |
| 20. Jeg går ikke rundt å sladrer om andre personers saker. |

IM items (Brazil)

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|---|
| 11. Às vezes minto se tiver que o fazer. |
| 12. Nunca escondo os meus erros. |
| 13. Eu sempre cumpro a lei, mesmo se for improvável ser apanhado. |
| 14. Já disse mal de um amigo nas suas costas. |
| 15. Quando ouço pessoas a falarem em privado, evito ouvir. |
| 16. Já recebi troco a mais de um vendedor e não lhe disse nada. |
| 17. Quando era jovem, às vezes roubava coisas. |
| 18. Já fiz coisas que não conto a ninguém. |
| 19. Nunca pego nada que não me pertença. |
| 20. Não costumo bisbilhotar sobre os assuntos dos outros. |

SDE items (Thailand)

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|--|
| 1. ความประทับใจครั้งแรกต่อผู้คนที่มักจะถูกต้อง |
| 2. มันเป็นการยากสำหรับฉันที่จะเลิกนิสัยที่ไม่ดีต่าง ๆ ของฉัน |
| 3. ฉันไม่ได้ซื้อสตั๊ดต่อตนเองเสมอไป |
| 4. ฉันจะรู้ว่าเหตุใดฉันถึงชอบสิ่งต่าง ๆ เสมอ |
| 5. เมื่อฉันได้ตัดสินใจใด ๆ ไปแล้ว ยากที่จะมีใครสามารถเปลี่ยนแปลงความคิดของฉันได้ |
| 6. มันเป็นการยากสำหรับฉันที่จะหยุดยั้งความคิดที่คอยรบกวนจิตใจได้ |
| 7. ฉันไม่เคยเสียใจกับการตัดสินใจของฉันเลย |
| 8. ฉันไม่ค่อยจะพอใจกับคำวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ |
| 9. ฉันเชื่อมั่นต่อการพิจารณาของฉัน |
| 10. ฉันมักจะไม่ทราบถึงเหตุผลว่าทำไมฉันถึงทำสิ่งที่ฉันทำอยู่ |

SDE items (Ukraine)

| |
|--|
| 1. Моє перше враження про людину зазвичай є правильним. |
| 2. Для мене було б важко кинути будь-яку мою шкідливу звичку. |
| 3. Я не завжди чесний з самим собою. |
| 4. Я завжди знаю, чому мені подобаються речі. |
| 5. Якщо я прийняв рішення, інші рідко можуть переконати мене змінити його. |
| 6. Для мене складно позбутися хвилюючих думок. |
| 7. Я ніколи не шкодую про рішення, які приймаю. |
| 8. Я рідко ціную критику щодо мене. |
| 9. Я завжди впевнений у своїх судженнях. |
| 10. Я не завжди знаю чому я роблю те, що роблю. |

IM items (Thailand)

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|--|
| 11. บางครั้งฉันพูดโกหกหากจำเป็นต้องทำ |
| 12. ฉันไม่เคยปกปิดความผิดของฉันเลย |
| 13. ฉันมักจะปฏิบัติตามกฎหมาย แม้ว่าฉันไม่น่าจะมีโอกาสถูกจับก็ตาม |
| 14. ฉันเคยพูดบางสิ่งที่ไม่ดีเกี่ยวกับเพื่อนลับหลัง |
| 15. เมื่อฉันได้ยินคนคุยกันเป็นส่วนตัว ฉันจะเสียดายไม่เข้าไปฟัง |
| 16. ฉันเคยได้รับเงินทอนเกินแล้วไม่ได้บอกกับพนักงานขาย |
| 17. เมื่อตอนฉันยังเด็ก ฉันเคยขโมยของ |
| 18. ฉันเคยทำบางสิ่งอย่างลงไปโดยไม่ได้เส้าให้ใครฟัง |
| 19. ฉันไม่เคยเก็บของที่ไม่ใช่ของของฉันไป |
| 20. ฉันไม่ชอบซุบซิบนินทาเรื่องของคนอื่น |

IM (Ukraine)

| |
|---|
| 11. Іноді я кажу неправду, якщо вимушений. |
| 12. Я ніколи не приховую свої помилки. |
| 13. Я завжди дотримуюсь закону, навіть якщо відсутня ймовірність, що мене піймають. |
| 14. Я казав погано про друга за його спиною. |
| 15. Якщо я чую, що люди говорять про щось особисте, я намагаюся їх не слухати. |
| 16. Я отримав на здачу більше грошей, ніж треба, але не сказав про це продавцеві. |
| 17. Коли я бум молодим, я інколи крав речі. |
| 18. Я робив те, про що не розповідав іншим людям. |
| 19. Я ніколи не беру ті речі, які мені не належать. |
| 20. Я не пліткую про справи інших людей. |

SDE items (Portugal)

| |
|---|
| 1. As minhas primeiras impressões sobre as pessoas, acabam normalmente por se tornar correctas |
| 2. Seria muito difícil para mim quebrar com os meus maus hábitos |
| 3. Nem sempre fui honesto comigo mesmo. |
| 4. Sei sempre porque gosto das coisas. |
| 5. Depois de ter formulado uma opinião, raramente as outras pessoas conseguem mudar a minha opinião |
| 6. É difícil para mim afastar um pensamento perturbador. |
| 7. Nunca me arrependo das minhas decisões |
| 8. Raramente aprecio críticas |
| 9. Tenho muita confiança nos meus julgamentos |
| 10. Nem sempre sei as razões pelas quais faço as coisas que faço. |

SDE items (Poland)

| |
|---|
| 1. Moje pierwsze wrażenie na temat ludzi zazwyczaj okazuje się prawdziwe. |
| 2. Byłoby mi bardzo trudno zerwać z którymkolwiek z moich złych nawyków. |
| 3. Nie zawsze jestem szczery(a) w stosunku do samego(ej) siebie. |
| 4. Zawsze wiem, dlaczego lubię różne rzeczy. |
| 5. Kiedy raz podejmę decyzję, rzadko ją zmieniam pod wpływem opinii innych ludzi. |
| 6. Jest mi trudno pozbyć się natrętnej, denerwującej myśli. |
| 7. Nigdy nie żałuję swoich decyzji. |
| 8. Rzadko doceniam krytykę. |
| 9. Jestem pewien swoich sądów. |
| 10. Nie zawsze znam przyczyny swojego postępowania. |

IM items (Portugal)

| |
|---|
| 11. Às vezes minto se tiver que o fazer |
| 12. Nunca escondo os meus erros |
| 13. Eu sempre cumpro a lei, mesmo se for improvável ser apanhado. |
| 14. Já disse mal de um amigo nas suas costas |
| 15. Quando ouço pessoas a falarem em privado, evito ouvir. |
| 16. Já recebi troco a mais de um vendedor e não lhe disse nada |
| 17. Quando era jovem, às vezes roubava coisas. |
| 18. Já fiz coisas que não conto a ninguém. |
| 19. Nunca pego em nada que não me pertença. |
| 20. Não costumo bisbilhotar sobre os assuntos dos outros. |

IM items (Poland)

| |
|---|
| 11. Czasami kłamię jeżeli muszę. |
| 12. Nigdy nie ukrywam swoich błędów. |
| 13. Zawsze przestrzegam prawo, nawet jeżeli nie jest prawdopodobne, że zostanę złapany. |
| 14. Kiedyś powiedziało(a)m coś złego na temat swojego przyjaciela(ółki) za jego(jej) plecami. |
| 15. Kiedy słyszę prywatną rozmowę staram się nie słuchać. |
| 16. Kiedyś sprzedawca wydał mi zbyt dużo reszty a ja nie powiedział(a) mu o tym. |
| 17. Kiedy byłem(a) młody(a) zdarzało mi się kraść rzeczy. |
| 18. Kiedyś robił(a)m rzeczy, o których nie mówię innym ludziom. |
| 19. Nigdy nie biorę rzeczy, które do mnie nie należą. |
| 20. Nie plotkuję na tematy dotyczące spraw innych ludzi. |

SDE items (Czech Republic)

| |
|--|
| 1. Můj první dojem z lidí se většinou ukáže jako správný. |
| 2. Bylo by pro mě těžké zbavit se kteréhokoli z mých špatných zvyků. |
| 3. Nebývám vždy sám(a) k sobě upřímný(á). |
| 4. Vždycky vím, proč se mi líbí dané věci. |
| 5. Pokud si jednou něco myslím, málokdy se podaří ostatním změnit můj názor. |
| 6. Je pro mě těžké odstranit znepokojivé myšlenky. |
| 7. Nikdy nelituji svých rozhodnutí. |
| 8. Málokdy ocením kritiku. |
| 9. Jsem si velmi jistý(á) svým úsudkem. |
| 10. Ne vždycky znám důvod, proč dělám věci, které dělám. |

SDE items (Hungary)

| |
|--|
| 1. Az első benyomásaim az emberekről általában helyesnek bizonyulnak. |
| 2. Nehéz lenne felhagyni a rossz szokásaimmal. |
| 3. Nem voltam mindig őszinte önmagammal. |
| 4. Mindig tudom, miért szeretem a dolgokat. |
| 5. Ha egyszer elhatároztam magam, mások ritkán tudják megváltoztatni a véleményem. |
| 6. Nehezen tudom elhessegetni a zavaró gondolatokat. |
| 7. Soha nem bánom meg a döntéseimet. |
| 8. Ritkán fogadom el a kritikát. |
| 9. Nagyon bízom a döntéseimben. |
| 10. Nem mindig tudom, miért teszem, amit teszek. |

IM items (Czech Republic)

| |
|---|
| 11. Když musím, tak občas zalžu. |
| 12. Nikdy nezakrývám své chyby. |
| 13. Vždycky dodržuji zákony, i když je velmi nepravděpodobné, že bych mohl(a) být chycen(a). |
| 14. Už jsem řekl(a) něco špatného o svém příteli za jeho zády. |
| 15. Pokud slyším lidi, kteří si povídají o něčem důvěrném, snažím se neposlouchat. |
| 16. Stalo se, že jsem dostal(a) jsem od prodáváče vráceno více peněz, než jsem měl(a) dostat, ale neupozornil(a) jsem ho na to. |
| 17. Když jsem byl(a) mladý(á), občas jsem něco ukradl(a). |
| 18. Udělal(a) jsem věci, o kterých jsem ostatním lidem neřekl(a). |
| 19. Nikdy si neberu věci, které mi nepatří. |
| 20. Nepomlouvám ostatní. |

IM items (Hungary)

| |
|---|
| 11. Néha hazudok, ha kell. |
| 12. Soha nem vallom be a hibáimat. |
| 13. Mindig betartom a törvényeket, akkor is ha nem valószínű, hogy elkapnának. |
| 14. Rosszat mondtam egy barátomról a háta mögött. |
| 15. Amikor emberek magánbeszélgetését hallom, igyekszem elkerülni a hallgatózást. |
| 16. Túl sok aprót kaptam egy eladótól és ezt nem mondtam meg neki. |
| 17. Amikor fiatal voltam, néha elloptam dolgokat. |
| 18. Tettem olyan dolgokat, amelyekről nem beszélek másoknak. |
| 19. Soha nem veszek el semmit, ami nem az enyém. |
| 20. Nem pletykálok más emberek dolgairól. |

SDE items (Romania)

| |
|---|
| 1. In general prima mea impresie despre oameni se dovedeste a fi corecta. |
| 2. Mi-ar fi greu sa renunt la obiceiurile mele proaste. |
| 3. N-am fost intotdeauna sincer cu mine insumi. |
| 4. Intotdeauna stiu de ce imi place fiecare lucru. |
| 5. Odata ce am luat o hotarare, cu greu mai poate cineva sa mi-o schimbe. |
| 6. Imi este greu sa indepartez un gand suparator. |
| 7. Niciodata nu-mi regret deciziile. |
| 8. Rareori apreciez critica. |
| 9. Sunt foarte increzator in judecata mea. |
| 10. Nu stiu intotdeauna de ce fac lucrurile pe care le fac. |

SDE items (Slovakia)

| |
|---|
| 1. Moje prvé dojmy o ľuďoch sa obyčajne ukážu byť správnymi. |
| 2. Bolo by pre mňa ťažké zbaviť sa niektorého zo zlozvykov. |
| 3. Nebol som vždy sám k sebe úprimný. |
| 4. Vždy viem, prečo mám niečo rád. |
| 5. Keď si vytvorím vlastný názor, sotva ma niekto donúti ho zmeniť. |
| 6. Ťažko sa zbavujem nejakej znepokojujúcej myšlienky. |
| 7. Nikdy neľutujem svoje rozhodnutia. |
| 8. Len zriedka ocením kritiku. |
| 9. Som si veľmi istý/á vlastným úsudkom. |
| 10. Nie vždy poznám príčiny svojho konania. |

IM items (Romania)

| |
|--|
| 11. Cateodata spun minciuni, daca trebuie. |
| 12. Niciodata nu-mi ascund greselile. |
| 13. Intotdeauna respect legile, chiar daca ar fi improbabil sa fiu prins. |
| 14. Am vorbit de rau, pe la spate, un prieten sau o prietena. |
| 15. Cand observ persoane "susotind" evit sa ascult. |
| 16. S-a intamplat sa primesc rest la cumparaturi o suma prea mare si sa nu atrag atentia vanzatorului / vanzatoarei. |
| 17. In tinerele uneori furam diverse lucruri. |
| 18. Am facut lucruri pe care nu le povestesc altora. |
| 19. Niciodata nu iau lucruri care nu-mi apartin. |
| 20. Nu barfesc despre treburile altora. |

IM items (Slovakia)

| |
|---|
| 11. Keď musím, tak niekedy zaklamem. |
| 12. Nikdy nezakrývam vlastné chyby. |
| 13. Vždy dodržiavam zákony, aj keď je nepravdepodobné, že by ma niekto prichytil. |
| 14. Stalo sa, že som povedal niečo zlé o svojom priateľovi za jeho chrbtom. |
| 15. Keď počujem niekoho súkromný rozhovor, snažím sa nepočúvať. |
| 16. Stalo sa, že mi predavačka vydala priveľa a nepovedal som jej to. |
| 17. Keď som bol malý, stalo sa, že som niečo ukradol. |
| 18. Urobil som veci, o ktorých nechcem pred inými ľuďmi hovoriť. |
| 19. Nikdy nevezmem vec, ktorá mi nepatrí. |
| 20. Nekrebetím o záležitostiach cudzích ľudí. |

SDE items (Sweden)

| |
|---|
| 1. Mitt första intryck av människor brukar visa sig stämma. |
| 2. Det skulle vara svårt för mig att bryta någon av mina dåliga vanor. |
| 3. Jag har inte alltid varit ärlig mot mig själv. |
| 4. Jag vet alltid varför jag tycker om vissa saker. |
| 5. När jag väl har bestämt mig kan andra människor sällan få mig att ändra uppfattning. |
| 6. Det är svårt för mig att stänga ute oroande tankar. |
| 7. Jag ångrar aldrig mina beslut. |
| 8. Jag uppskattar sällan kritik. |
| 9. Jag är mycket säker i mina bedömningar. |
| 10. Jag vet inte alltid varför jag gör som jag gör. |

SDE items (Spain)

| |
|--|
| 1. Mis primeras impresiones sobre la gente suelen ser acertadas. |
| 2. Me sería difícil romper con cualquiera de mis malos hábitos. |
| 3. No siempre he sido sincero conmigo mismo. |
| 4. Siempre sé por qué me gustan las cosas. |
| 5. Una vez que me decido, es muy difícil que alguien me haga cambiar de opinión. |
| 6. Me resulta difícil apartar un pensamiento perturbador. |
| 7. Nunca me arrepiento de mis decisiones. |
| 8. Raramente agradezco las críticas. |
| 9. Me fío mucho de mis deducciones. |
| 10. No siempre sé por qué motivos hago las cosas. |

IM items (Sweden)

| |
|--|
| 11. Jag ljugar ibland om det behövs. |
| 12. Jag försöker aldrig dölja mina misstag. |
| 13. Jag följer alltid lagar och regler även om det inte är troligt att jag skulle åka fast. |
| 14. Det har hänt att jag har sagt något elakt om en vän bakom hans/hennes rygg. |
| 15. När jag hör att människor talar om något privat försöker jag låta bli att lyssna. |
| 16. Det har hänt att jag har fått för mycket växel tillbaka från en försäljare utan att tala om det för honom/henne. |
| 17. När jag var ung hände det att jag stal saker. |
| 18. Jag har gjort saker som jag inte berättar om för andra. |
| 19. Jag tar aldrig sådant som inte tillhör mig. |
| 20. Jag skvallrar inte om andra människors angelägenheter. |

IM items (Spain)

| |
|--|
| 11. A veces miento si tengo que hacerlo. |
| 12. Nunca oculto mis errores. |
| 13. Siempre obedezco las leyes, incluso aunque sea difícil que me descubran. |
| 14. He hablado alguna vez mal de un amigo a sus espaldas. |
| 15. Cuando oigo a la gente teniendo una conversación privada, intento no escucharla. |
| 16. Si un vendedor me ha dado cambio de más, algunas veces no digo nada. |
| 17. Cuando era joven, a veces robaba cosas. |
| 18. He hecho cosas de las que no le he hablado a nadie. |
| 19. Nunca cojo cosas que no me pertenezcan. |
| 20. No cotilleo sobre los asuntos de otras personas. |

SDE items (UK / USA / Ireland)

| |
|--|
| 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. |
| 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. |
| 3. I have not always been honest with myself. |
| 4. I always know why I like things. |
| 5. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. |
| 6. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. |
| 7. I never regret my decisions. |
| 8. I rarely appreciate criticism. |
| 9. I am very confident of my judgments. |
| 10. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. |

IM items (UK / USA / Ireland)

| |
|--|
| 11. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. |
| 12. I never cover up my mistakes. |
| 13. I always obey laws, even if I am unlikely to get caught. |
| 14. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. |
| 15. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. |
| 16. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. |
| 17. When I was young I sometimes stole things. |
| 18. I have done things that I don't tell other people about. |
| 19. I never take things that don't belong to me. |
| 20. I don't gossip about other people's business. |



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