Nima Haghpanah
415 Kern Building
Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802


nima.haghpanah at gmail.com

Resume

I am an assistant professor of Economics at Penn State.

I am a microeconomic theorist (and also a CS theorist). I study mechanism design, information design, and price discrimination.


Work in Progress

Selling to a Group [Slides]
with Aditya Kuvalekar and Elliot Lipnowski
Abstract in ACM EC 2021

Pareto Improving Segmentation of Multi-product markets [Slides]
with Ron Siegel
R&R, Journal of Political Economy
Abstract in ACM EC 2019 as Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation

Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Individual Rationality
with Itai Ashlagi and Constantinos Daskalakis
R&R, Operations Research
Abstract in ACM EC 2016

A Cooperative Theory of Market Segemntation by Consumers
with Ron Siegel

Publications

The Limits of Multi-Product Price Discrimination
with Ron Siegel
American Economic Review: Insights (forthcoming)

How to Sell Hard Information [Slides]
with S. Nageeb Ali, Xiao Lin, and Ron Siegel
Quarterly Journal of Economics 2022

When Is Pure Bundling Optimal? [Slides]
with Jason Hartline
Review of Economic Studies 2021
Abstract in ACM EC 2015 as Reverse Mechanism Design
(Supersedes Multidimensional Virtual Values and Second Degree Price Discrimination which is no longer in development.)

Full Surplus Extraction from Samples [Slides]
with Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, and Robert Kleinberg
Journal of Economic Theory 2021

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
with Nikhil Devanur and Alex Psomas
Games and Economic Behavior 2020
Abstract in ACM EC 2017

Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms
with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, and Azarakhsh Malekian
Mathematics of Operations Research 2019
Abstract in ACM EC 2012

Revenue Maximization with Non-excludable Goods
with MohammadHossein Bateni, Balu Sivan, and Morteza Zadimoghaddam
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 2015
Preliminary version in WINE 2013

Optimal Auctions with Positive Network Externalities
with Nicole Immorlica, Vahab Mirrokni, and Kamesh Munagala
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 2013
Abstract in ACM EC 2011

Equilibrium Pricing with Positive Externalities
with Nima Anari, Shayan Ehsani, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nicole Immorlica, Hamid Mahini, and Vahab Mirrokni
Theoretical Computer Science 2013
Preliminary version in WINE 2010
Conference Papers

Exchange Market Mechanisms without Money
with Zeinab Abbassi and Vahab Mirrokni
WINE 2015

The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, and Jason Hartline
FOCS 2013

Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks
with Hessamedin Akhlaghpour, Mohammad Ghodsi, Hamid Mahini, Vahab Mirrokni, and Afshin Nikzad
WINE 2010

Thesis

Optimal Multi-parameter Auction Design
Northwestern University 2014
Mechanism Design Topics Lecture Notes

I use these notes for my PhD topics class. If you find typos, please email me and let me know.

Week 1: Screening
Week 2: Auctions
Week 3: VCG and implementability
Week 4: Dynamic mechanisms
Week 5: Multi-dimensional screening
Week 6: Robustness and worst case analysis
Week 7: Information design
Week 8: Robust contracts